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SPEECH 



JOHN BELL, OF TENNESSEE, 



THE MEXICAN ¥AR. 



Delivered in the Senate of the United States, February 2 and 3, 1848. 



Mr. President : I believe it is in bad taste to offer any apology for addressing 
the Senate on the ground of feeble health, or of inadequate preparation, or for 
any other cause. Every gentleman is at liberty to speak or be silent, as he may 
determine for himself. 1 will, therefore, make none for the remarks I propose to 
submit, although they may not be characterized by much novelty. But this is a, 
1 question of such unusual importance that I think some allowance may be made for 
gentlemen, although ihey may fail to offer any thing fresh or interesting after a. 
ussion so long continued, and with such ability, on both sides of the chamber. 
Indeed, upon a subject presenting so wide a field for debate, and so rich and varied 
in its topics as the present, it must be the fault of the speaker if he can offer noth- 
ing somewhat new. 

This is a question, sir, on which I could not feel justified in maintaining silence. 
I cannot say, with another Senator, that had this measure been permitted to pass 
without debate, or a division by yeas and nays, 1 would have been content without 
expressing my views upon it. J feel bound to pursue a different course for several 
reasons. This is a question upon which the public mind is peculiarly sensitive. 
The first impulse of the patriotic and reflecting part of the community, in every 
section of the country, is in favor of alb supplies which may be demanded by the 
department entrusted with the direction of the military operations of the Govern- 
ment, when a war is flagrant. This measure bears the impress of Executive re- 
commendation, and those who oppose it will be strictly reckoned with. The peo- 
ple will require sufficient reasons. By the theory of our system, our voice is net 
so much our own as that of the constituency we represent. I came to Washington, 
expecting to give my support to every such measure as the present, that might be 
brought before the Senate ; and, in doing so, I would be responding to the general 
sentiment of the State which I in part represent, as that sentiment existed a few- 
months ago. I am proud to have it in my power to say of the people of that 
State, that they will permit no considerations of party interest or prejudice to 
embarrass the Government in the prosecution of an existing war, whatever objec- 
tions they may have, to its origin, or the motives and objects with which it is waged, 
unless those objects shall appear mischievous and ruinous to the country ; and I do 
not doubt that every other Senator may boast a constituency equally patriotic. Those 
objects, as heretofore understood, though not approved by a large portion of them, yet, 
as there seemed to be no other mode of terminating the war consistently with the 
avowed policy of the Administration than by a vigorous prosecution of it, they were 
favorable to that course. But, sir, since the further development of the views of~ 
the Ex ecutive in the late message and other official documents, some of them clearly 
Towers, printer, comer of D and 7th sts. opposite National Intelligencer. 



enough and others darkly stated and shadowed forth, I must suppose that, a corres- 
ponding change in public opinion and sentiment upon this subject' will follow. 

A fain, sir, I consider that to vote for this measure is to approve, to the fullest 
extent, the policy of the Administration in the further prosecution of this war. To 
sit in silence and to suffer it to pass without remonstrance would be an acquiescence 
in that policy, not in the power of those who are now silent, when hereafter lb« 
evil is upon the country, to retract or deny. They cannot say that they wore not 
sufficiently forewarned by the Administration of what would or might be the fiuaP 
and momentous result of this policy. 

I believe, with one or two exceptions, the entire Senate has heretofore promptly 
voted every supply, both of men and money, demanded by the Executive for the 
prosecution of this war. The Senator from Illinois, (Mr. Douglas--. ) in his speech 
on yesterday, insisted that the Whigs of the Senate had suddenly changed their 
tactics, and are now in opposition to their former liberal course. It is my purpose, 
sir, to show that the Administration has changed its policy — that it is no longer 
what it was twelve months ago. 

But, Mr. President, I must be indulged in a few other preliminary remarks- be- 
fore I proceed to the main purpose of my argument. 

I shall not. stop to discuss several of the questions which distinguished Senators 
seemed to think of importance, and upon which they have employed much close 
and cogent argument. I shall not stop to inquire whether the President, by his 
order to General Taylor of the 13ih of January, 1846, intended to bring on a war ; 
I shall not inquire whether Mexico or the United Stales committed the first act <>i 
military aggression upon disputed territory, nor shall I delay to inquire whether 
the war was constitutionally brought on. It is enough for me that it exists ; that 
that it has received the sanction of the legislative department of the Government, 
whatever I may think of the notable device by which that sanction was extorted. 
I shall not iuquiie whether the war might not have been avoided, though I think 
it might and should. I shall not inquire whether the President was, from the first, 
actuated by a settled purpose of acquiring territory by conquest ; nor shall I ex- 
amine the circumstances connected with the origin of the war to prove that it is 
unjust and iniquitous. If it were so, for myself I would rather seek to cast a veil 
over the record, or blot it out forever. Rut in saying this I mean no censure upon 
the course of honorable Senators, or others who take a different view of the ques- 
tion. They doubtless have a deep and abiding conviction of the injustice of this 
war, and their exalted sense of duty to themselves and their country impels them 
to proclaim this their honest conviction. Put I shall neither seek to fasten this 
conviction upon my own mind, nor upon that of others. For myself I choose to 
indulge the pleasing reflection, the illusion, if it be one, that up to this period at 
least no such untoward development of the tendencies of our system has occurred, 
as that the constituted authorities selected by the free and enlightened suffrages of 
the people have, in the mere wantonness of power and the unbridled lust of do- 
minion, perpe'rated so great an outrage upon a neighboring nation, and upon the 
rights of humanity. 

Sir, I take this occasion to say that I have little sympathy for the Mexican re- 
public or the Mexican rulers, now or at any recent period. So fin- as they could, 
by their example, they have brought opprobrium and disgrace upon the cause of 
free institutions, and upon the very name of republic. I have none at all for those 
faithless, gasconading chiefs, who have so long oppressed the masses of their 
countrymen with their exactions and all the evils of fiction and anarchy. I can 
sympathize with the honest and enlightened patriots, as there are doubtless some 
such in Mexico, who are struggling to maintain the honor of their country, the 
integrity of their soil, and the existence or their nationality. I can sympathize, 
too, with the mass of unoffending inhabitants, the non-combatants, who are the 
victims of war. But, I repeat, I have no sympathy for their vain-glorious, factious 
chiefs, nor for any government of their founding. 



I shall further avail myself of this occasion to state, that I do not hold Mexico 
to be altogether blameless of this war, and of all its bloody consequences ; neither 
in its origin, nor in the conduct of it, on their part. In the revolution in Texas ; 
in the circumstances of connivance, If not of encouragement, on the part of the 
Government of the United States attending that event ; in the final annexation of 
Texas without first negotiating the consent of Mexico, she might well feel her na- 
tional pride wounded — she might well, as the weaker power, conceive that she 
had not been dealt with in that spirit of conciliation and courtesy which the pro- 
fessions of amity on our part made proper. In truth, the annexation of Texas, 
under all the circumstances preceding and attending it, was not a very neighborly 
act on our part ; nor do I think, without pretending to be well informed on the sub- 
ject, that the character of this country was duly consulted and respected in the 
manner in which that act was consummated. Then Mexico had some cause of 
complaint against this Government. But, on the other hand, we had causes of 
complaint against Mexico. I need not enumerate them. I do not say there was 
sufficient cause of war, for that might imply that it was expedient to declare war 
before the collision of arms on the Rio Grande ; but if the grounds of those com- 
plaints had not been removed, ii'Mexico had persevered in her hostile policy towards 
the United States, after all the usual means of conciliation and amicable adjust- 
ment, such as we have employed towards other and more powerful nations under 
similar circumstances, had been exhausted on our part, I cannot say that we would 
not have been justified in declaring war by any code of public morals or of inter- 
national law recognised among civilized nations. Hence, I am not of opinion that 
there is any thing in the mode of bringing on this war, nor in its past conduct on 
■our part, nor in the conduct of Mexico, which should restrain us as a just and mag- 
nanimous people, if we think it expedient to our interest, (I speak not of honor, 
for that has already been amply vindicated — Mexico has fully atoned, both in blood 
and the other calamities of war, for any violation of our honor) — I say, if we think 
it expedient to any of our great interests, commercial or military, I can see 
nothing to restrain us from claiming the rights of the conqueror to any moderate 
extent which those interests require; and which would be neither unreasonable 
nor oppressive in us to demand, nor dishonorable or ruinous to Mexico to concede 
as the vanquished ^>aity. 

But, sir, it is a far different question how far I would go ; how much more blood, 
how much more treasure, I would sacrifice in a war waged undy present circum- 
stances : under the recent development of the policy of the Administration, in the 
.further prosecution of this war. The question as now presented involves not so- 
much the consideration of what we may honorably and rightfully do in reference 
to Mexico as the vanquished party in a war of which she cannot claim to be 
blameless, as of other questions and consequences deeply and vitally affecting the 
■Union, and the policy and principles of our own Government 

I beg, Mr. President, to be (indulged in a few other preliminary remarks which 
now occur to me as appropriate to the subject. When I said that I would not dis- 
cuss certain questions in regard to the propriety of this war, its justice or injustice, 
I beg leave to explain that I would feel that I had a perfect right to do otherwise 
if I thought the interests of the country demanded such a course. I have had, 
sir, a pretty large experience in public life, but have not as yet disciplined myself 
into perfect indifference or callousness as to what may be said, whether in this 
body or out of it, in regard to the motives which control my own course, or that of 
those with whom I am associated. The remarks which I am about to oner are 
prompted by the continued denunciations which I meet with in some of the public 
journals of the day. I hold, sir, for one, that gentlemen who believe this war to 
be unjust and iniquitous, or, whether just or unjust, that the further prosecution of 
it is likely to inflict upon the country greater evils than can be compensated by all 
the territorial acquisitions which the courage and resources of the country may 
achieve, have a perfect right to arraign the authors of it at the bar of 



public opinion, and to thwart them by all the means of speech, writing, and 
voting which the constitution warrants. I hold, sir, that to deny to them the exer- 
cise of this privilege by law would he an act of despotism under legal forms ; and 
to seek to forestall the exercise of this privilege by intimidation and the influence 
of official denunciation, by charging those who avail themselves of this privilege 
as the allies of the public enemy and their auxiliaries in the war, is an attempt at 
moral despotism, only to be excused as an emanation of excessive and over-heated 
zeal, in which neither the judgment nor a proper regard for the institutions of free- 
dom have had much to do. 

Why, sir, alter Mexico shall have fallen under our conquering arms in the souths 
and the British possessions in the north, let us suppose that the spirit of progres- 
sive democracy, which is becoming so rife in the land, emboldened by past suc- 
cess, should succeed in converting this people into a nation of propagandists, and 
with the aid of such fanatic givings-out as that it is destiny — that it is our mission — 
should actually involve us in a war with all Europe — if a large portion of the re- 
flecting and intelligent citizens of this country should be of opinion that such aeon- 
test could have no other end than to destroy our foreign commerce, exhaust our re- 
sources, cover the ocean with pirates, afflict the world with the calamities of war, 
and retard instead of advancing civilization and the cause of civil liberty, would 
they not be recreant to their duty and traitors to their country, were they to seal 
their lips and view in silence the progress of such wild and extravagant schemes? 
Yet, sir, I dare avow that even in such a war we should find the organs of the 
dominant party — the recipients of Executive patronage all over the country — herald- 
ing the same charge of treason and alliance with the public enemy against those 
patriots who might have the courage to bare themselves to the slorm. 

Well, sir, if in the present war there are those who honestly believe that the real 
objects of it — that even those territorial acquisitions which are openly avowed as 
the objects of it in part — would prove an apple of discord at home, a source of dan- 
gerous domestic dissension — would be a curse rather than a blessing to the coun- 
try — are their lips to be sealed for fear their voices may penetrate the council 
chamber of the Government of Mexico, and disincline it to a treaty? Such a re- 
sult, evil as it may be, is only one of the inconveniences incident to that system of" 
freedom which is our only guaranty for the preservation of all ouj liberties, and the 
boasted superiority of our own over all other forms of government. Bur, sir, should 
the tone of remonstrance against this war raise' so high in this chamber as to pen- 
etrate every vale in Mexico, reverberate among her mountains, and rouse the whole 
population to a spirit of resistance to the attempt to subdue them to our domininon, 
there are those who believe that a greater calamity may befal this country, in the 
further prosecution of this war, than even such a resutt as that. 

But, it is said, the war still goes on ; our armies are in the field ; the blood of our 
countrymen still flows in repeated conflicts with an obstinate and infatuated peo- 
ple ; our detachments are cut off, and our straggling soldiers are daily pieced by the 
lances of the murderous guerrilleros ; and will you not forbear for their sakes ? 
Who forbear? Who should forbear? The opponents of this war ? Those who 
believe, not that the success of our arms, but of the policy in support of which they 
are employed abroad, would bring defeat and disaster upon our institutions at home ? 
And who are they who oppose this war and the policy of the President in the fur- 
ther prosecution of it ? Are they of any one section of the Union ? Do they be- 
long exclusively to the North or to the South? Have they shunned the perils and 
privations of the war when called by the constituted authorities of the country to 
the support of her eagles ? They are those who have borne their full share of the 
burdens of the war ; they are those who have given their full proportion, both of 
substance and of blood, to maintain the supremacy of our arms. And what are 
their numbers? I verily believe that two-thirds of the people of this country are 
in heart opposed to the policy of this war, whatever may be their opinions six 
months hence ; and but for the tyranny of party, the force of party obligation, and 



the power of Executive influence, could they be allowed to speak — satiated with 
the glory already acquired, the honor of the country already amply vindicated — they 
would strangle this Hydra to-day. Would theirs be the voice of faclion ? 

Who, then, I repeat, should forbear in order to spare the further effusion of blood 
in Mexico? The powerful array of those opposed to the war, who believe that the 
further prosecution of it, for the objects avowed, would be mischievous and disastrous 
to their own country ? Or shall not the President and the advisers and the cham- 
pions of his policy be called on to yield up their pride of consistency, to sacrifice 
their visions of national, and may be personal glory, in the projected enlargement 
of the boundaries of the republic, upon the altar of public harmony and of the Union ? 
Sir, the voice of a large portion of their countrymen is opposed to their policy; they 
have a right to cause it to be heard through all the channels of public intelligence. 
It has long since penetrated the interior of the White House, and if the President 
and his counsellors shall disregard its warnings ; if, having the power in their own 
hands, wielding at their will an army of more than forty thousand of the choicest 
troops in the world, they shall continue to prosecute this war; if our gallant fellows 
are still destined to fall by the hand of a defeated but still resisting foe ; should the 
war be increased in fury and destructiveness until the plains and mountain passes 
of all Anahuac run blood, and still there shall be no treaty — no peace — upon whom 
will rest the fearful responsibility ? When the day of accounting shall come — and 
it will come — from whom will the country demand a reckoning ? From tho-e who, 
reckless of human suffering and in despite of the warning voice of their own coun- 
trymen, persevere in the execution of an inexhorable and fatal policy. 

Mr. President I have occupied more time in these remarks than I intended, and 
much more than their importance may be supposed to justify : I trust, however, 
they are not altogether inappropriate. 

I have already stated that to pass this bill would be to approve the policy of the 
Administration in the further prosecution of the war. What is that policy ? I 
desire to speak with a'l duq courtesy and deference to the President of the United 
States and his friends and supporters on this floor; but I would earnestly inquire 
what is the real policy of the Administration in the further prosecution of the 
war ? And with like deference to the distinguished chairman of the Committee 
on Military Affairs, I must be allowed to say that I have a right, not as an individ- 
ual, but as a member of this body, to a somewhat more explicit expression of what 
he holds to be that policy than he has hitherto chosen to give us ; and I inquire 
now what is the policy of the Administration in the further prosecution of this 
war ? I know that one gentleman will very readily answer, it is for the purpose 
of " conquering an honorable peace;" and another will reply that it is for the pur- 
pose of securing " indemnity for the past and security for the future." But these 
are Delphic responses, mere vague generalities, noncommittals, and may be con- 
strued to mean any thing that may be done in future, provided only that some mea- 
sure of indemnity is obtained. 

The President is more explicit in his message. He informs us that New Mexi- 
co and California are already in our possession, and must not be given up. This 
is all very fair and candid, so far as it goes. But what further acquisition of terri- 
tory is to be demanded of Mexico ? If none, and if those provinces now in our 
possession Would be regarded as a satisfactory indemnity, why not, in view of the 
uncertainty and embarrassments which lie in the way of an early termination of 
the war, fall back upon those provinces and hold them, and thus limit the waste of 
life, and spare the country the enormous expenditure which attend our present mili- 
tary operations in Mexico? The reply will be, Oh, we have no treaty, the war 
will still be open, we shall have no peace ! Well, I will take gentlemen upon 
their own ground. Suppose that you have or may have a treaty with the Govern- 
ment now assembled at Qucretaro, ceding California and New Mexico, would 
that be satisfactory to the Administration ? I would be glad to hear from some 
honorable Senator whether such a treaty with the existing Government of Mexico 



6 

would be satisfactory, or do you want still more territory? I should be glad to 
bear from my friend, the Senator from Mississippi, (Mr. Foote,) on this subject. 
What more does he want than' those provinces ? I know that he is too candid and 
too courageous to withhold the expression of his sentiments. 

Mr. Foote. I have no hesitation in answering the question proposed ; but, in 
doin"- so, desire to be understood as having no authority to commit any person but 
myself. If a treaty can be obtained with some Government in Mexico, entitled 
to respect as such, which should give us the Californ'ias and New Mexico, with a 
reasonable prospect of such treaty being observed on the part of Mexico, for one 
I should be content on the point of indemnity. 

Mr. Bell. I am gratified with the bold, unhesitating reply of the Senator. It 
is such as I expected from him. He would be satisfied with a treaty made with 
the existing Government, on condition that it would bring with it present and per- 
manent peace. 

Mr. Foote. The Senator misconceives my meaning. It is a question ofsomo 
delicacy, and one upon which I wish to be understood. It is true, as the honora- 
ble Senator says, that for the purpose of securing peace — though I do not dread the 
result, in case they refuse to make peace — if the Government of Mexico, at any 
time hereafter, or at present, turns out to be such a Government as we can rely 
upon, and such territory as I have spoken of be granted to us, and there be circum- 
stances which would authorize the reasonable expectation that the peace will not 
be violated, I would be perfectly content. 

Mr. Bell. I believe I understand the answer of the honorable Senator. I 
understood him as speaking the sentiments of the Administration. 
Mr. Foote. I speak for myself. 

Mr. Bell. I now understand, I trust, something of the views of the Adminis- 
tration. A treaty with the existing Government of Mexico, embracing a cession 
of such territory as he desires, would be satisfactory to the Senator from Missis- 
sippi, upon the condition that it should bring with it assurances of a permanent 
peace. But I desire further information. What assurance, what guaranty of 
peace do you demand ? Do you desire a further indemnity in money ? The hon- 
orable Senator near me (Mr. Cass) will say no, he scorns it. Then, what further 
do you want than New Mexico and California, by way of security for the future ? 
What says the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs to this 
question] 

Mr. Cass (in his seat) said that he might choose to answer when the Senator's 
argument was more fully developed. 

Mr. Bell. I wish to press horns the inquiry, and I say to Senators, and par- 
ticu'arly to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, will 
you be satisfied with the cession of New Mexico and California as an indemnity? 
You would ; you want no more territory — no money. What more, then, do you 
want? If you say you would be ^atisiied without any thing more, then I put tho 
question to the honorable Senator, (Mr. Cass,) when you demand indemnity forth© 
past and security for the future, what is it you mean by " securitv for the future ?" 
When a question was asked, in the progress of this discussion, of some honorable 
Senator on the other side of the chamber, as to the object of the Administration in 
the further prosecution of the war, the answer was, indemnity. The chairman of 
the Committee on Military Affairs, (Mr. Cass,) sitting in his place, added, "and 
security for the future ?" Rioreover, what does the message mean in declaring 
that the war must be prosecuted until we obtain indemnity for the past and security 
for tho future ? Will the Senator answer that the phrase " security for the fu- 
ture" has no distinct or substantive meaning; that it is merely an expletive, the 
effect of careless composition? I am sure that the able and distinguished Senator 
will not say so. What, then, does the honorable Senator say to the question, what 
is meant by " security for the future ?" I will, for the present, answer for him, 
alter I shall have stated what I understand to bo tho real policy of the Administra.- 



tion in the further prosecution of the war. From the date of the failure of Mr, 
'Prist's negotiation, and the splendid success of Gen. Scott, the President and his 
advisers no longer limited their views to a treaty which should merely cede the 
territories of New Mexico and California, but one which should bring with it am- 
ple. security for the future — security for a permanent peace. That I understood to 
be the policy of the Administration. I understand that no treaty with the existing 
Government of Mexico will be satisfactory, either to the Administration or its sup- 
porters on this floor, unless it can furnish security for the future — security for a 
permanent peace between the two countries. 

Mr. Foote. Do 1 understand the honorable Senator as referring to me ? I 
have already said that I would be satisfied with a treaty giving us so much territo- 
ry as is comprised within the limits of New Mexico and California, if adequate 
security, as to the observance of the treaty on the part of Mexico, should also be 
obtained. I have always doubted, and still doubt, whether the adequate security 
could be obtained without establishing the Sierra Madre as a line of military de- 
fence, and retaining the Castle of San Juan de tflua and other strong places in 
temporary occupancy. 

Mr. Bioli,. I think I understand the views of the honorable Senator. I do not 
desire to misinterpret the views of the honorable Senator, or of the Administra- 
tion. I take the position that the phrase "security for the future" has a substan- 
tive meaning. I suppose that the Administration can make no treaty with the ex- 
isting Government of Mexico which will not be liable to be disregarded and repu- 
diated the moment our artnie s are withdrawn, unless the contemplated securities be 
required in addition to the indemnity. Then I press the inquiry, What are the na- 
ture and extent of the "security for the future" which will be demanded of Mexi- 
co? What security of any kind can the existing Government, or the faction now 
in power, give that would be satisfactory? Is it a mere stipulation in the treaty 
for future peace and friendly commercial relations? I take it for granted that is 
not the nature of the security intended, as all treaties include a peace and amity 
clause. Is it intended to stipulate for the retention of the castle of San Juan de 
Ulua for a term of years or indefinitely I I cannot suppose that any such treaty is 
expected. Is it in contemplation to have the guaranty of any foreign Power? You 
are precluded from any such resort by having proclaimed that you will suffer no 
transatlantic Powers to obtain any additional dominion in America ; and you will 
not give them any pretext for doing so. 

Having, then, no confidence in any treaty the existing Government of Mexico 
can make, as a '-security for the future," what is the clear and inevitable conclu- 
sion upon this view of the matter? Why that you neither expect nor desire a 
treajy with any existing Government in Mexico ; that the Government on which 
you rely to make such a treaty as shall afford the security you demand, is a Gov- 
ernment to be formed and nurtured into maturity and stability under your tuition 
and protection. This may be regarded as a very bold assertion ; but I reassert 
that this Administration neither expects nordesi.es a treaty with any existing Gov- 
ernment in Mexico, and that the Government with which they propose to treat is 
yet to be brought into existence. 

No, sir, the Administration can make no treaty with the present shadow of a Go. 
vemment in Mexico, ceding New Mexico and California, consistently with the de 
termination avowed in the message of "requiring security for the future." The 
learned and eloquent Senator from New York, (Mr. Dix,) in a speech to which I 
listened with the. greatest pleasure — a speech, by the by, replete with the noblest 
sentiments and the soundest views and maxims, in every part of which I COWW, 
except the conclusions to which he came in relation to this war — has givo-a the 
Senate some further insight into the probable extent of that, security for the future 
which the Administration proposes to demand of Mexico. It is not only to guard 
against hostilities between the two Powers on any boundary which may hereafter 
be established by treaty, but to ensure Mexico herself from the intrusion and in. 



8 

terference of any foreign Government; to provide against any transatlantic sway 
over Mexico, to which the present and ever recurring factions expose her, or rather 
invite. 

This I take to be the solution of the enigma ; of the mystic phrase, " security 
for the future," so often repeated, and yet never explained by the advocates of the 
measure under discussion. The policy of the Administration is to secure such a 
treaty from such a government in Mexico as will afford satisfactory guaranties for 
a permanent peace on our own borders, and prevent any foreign Power from ob- 
taining a foothold in Mexico ; and this war is to be prolonged until a new Govern, 
ment is formed, under the protection of our arms, such as can give the security re- 
quired. I challenge honorable Senators to say whether this is not the policy of 
the Administration, and I do not exclude the honorable chairman of the Committee 
on Military Affairs. 

Sir, that this was the policy of the Administration when the message was de- 
livered, and when the bill was introduced, I think, is clear. 

There may be change in the policy of the Executive in the further prosecution 
of this war. The cloud which has for seme time past been gathering over the 
Treasury, and which every day assumes a more threatening aspect, may have given 
birth to a modified policy. Of this I can know nothing; but one thing I do know ; 
if a treaty is made with any existing government in Mexico embracing a cession 
of territory only, the responsibility of advising it will be thrown upon the Senate. 
(t will not be advised by the President. But in saying this I mean no disparage- 
ment to the President ; I mean not to impute any want of firmness or a disposi- 
tion to shrink from his just responsibility. Sir, 1 have no rankling feeling here 
(pointing to his heart) that I seek to gratify. In my toilsome ascent up the hill 
of life, 1 have long since learned the folly, if not the wickedness, of indulging 
such feelings, the offspring of past and fierce political conflicts. My experience 
has taught me that the most grievous injuries a public man is liable to receive 
are inflicted not by political opponents. The arrows that go deepest here (Mr. B. 
with the hand upon his heart) are sped by friendly hands ; by companions and cola- 
borers in a common cause, and often by those we have most cherished, most served. 
No, sir, when I say that the President will throw upon the Senate the responsibility 
of advising such a treaty as I have described, I mean that he cannot do otherwise 
consistently with the policy avowed in the message. And if such a treaty shall 
be laid before the Senate, and it is reasonable in other respects, I would un.'te 
with his friends in extricating him from the embarrassment in which he is placed, 
believing that in so doing I would at the same time be extricating my country 
from the evils which impend over it. This I could cheerfully do, leaving the 
President in the full enjoyment of all his honors, and his reputation unimpaired. 

But, Mr. President, if I have not mistaken the policy of the Administration in 
the further prosecution of the war, I feel warranted in maintaining that the large 
and enlightened class of patriotic citizens every where, who, though opposed to 
the policy of this war from its commencement, have yet felt it their duty hereto- 
fore to sustain the Executive in the prosecution of it, have been giving their sup- 
port to a masked policy. The whole country has been deluded with the expec- 
tation and belief that it was the policy of the Executive to coerce a treaty with any 
existing government or phantom of a government that may exist in Mexico speedily, 
and that a cession of some moderate portion of territory and the settlement of un- 
adjusted boundaries were the only terms that would be exacted from Mexico. The 
country has been led to suppose that whatever measure of supply might be de- 
manded would have reference only to an early termination of the war, when in fact, 
consistently with the policy of the Administration as now understood, the war is to 
be prolonged, with all the attendant consequences of a waste of life and treasure, 
indefinitely, and until a government shall be built up in Mexico, and attain maturity 
under the protection of our arms, which can give the securities I have pointed out. 



After all, sir, these may be said to be my own individual conclusions. It may 
be said that the policy of the Executive is still to obtain an immediate treaty with 
any Government in Mexico, stable or unstable, which may be willing to treat ; 
and that the importance I have given to the words " security for the future" is 
gratuitous and unfounded. Well, sir, under this view of the question. I beg leave 
to repeat an inquiry I had before made. If New Mexico and California would be 
regarded as a sufficient indemnity, and nothing else is sought, why not. fall back upon 
those territories and hold them by force ? You say there will be no peace. Well, 
sir, when can you promise the country a peace, as the result of your present plan ? 
But you insist that, after such sacrifices of blood and treasure : after having conquered 
in so many battles ; after having captured so many cities and strongholds of the ene- 
my, it would be inglorious and preposterous to abandon them without a treaty. Here, 
sir, we are met by that fatal argument of the "force of circumstances" — the same 
which impelled us into the war, and across the Rio Grande. It is the same that 
twelve months ago, after the battle of Monterey, and when you had already con- 
quered more than a third of the whole of the Mexican territory, caused you to decline 
the policy of a defensive line recommended by Gen. Taylor, and urged by the distin- 
guished Senator from South Carolina, who, from the beginning of this war, had the 
sagacity to perceive the dangers which threatened the country. The argument then 
was. we have gone too far to retreat ; we have been too successful to abandon further 
operations without a treaty ; we must teach the enemy a lesson ; we must penetrate 
the interior of the country ; wo must carry our arms into the heart of Mexico. Well, 
sir, you have carried the war into the very heart of the enemy's country, and are 
now revelling on its vitals ; and still you have no treaty, no peace. The argu- 
ment founded on the force of circumstance has acquired increased weight and 
importance. You must now extend your operations ; you call for ten thousand 
additional regular troops to enable you to overrun the whole country ; to cause 
the calamities of war to be felt throughout all her borders ; and you are led by 
the force of circumstances to pursue this " ignis fatilus" of peace and a treaty, 
which siill eludes you and lures you onward into the meshes of a policy from which 
yo'i can never extricate yourselves. 

But you say you will extricate yourselves ; that you will overrun the whole 
country, take all the strongholds and populous States, levy contributions, and in 
this way coerce a treaty ; and V this experiment should fail, you announce your 
determination to take the full measure of indemnity into your own hands. 

How long, sir, is the war to be continued in making this experiment — one, or 
two, or live years ? The policy itself indicates that time will be an important ele- 
ment in carrying it out. You cannot recruit these ten new regiments and get 
them into the field in less than six or eight months. In less than one year,, then, 
you can expect no result. And what will be the cost of this experiment? To 
maintain an army of fifty thousand men in Mexico, without having any certain 
data upon which to form an estimate, I hazard nothing in saying it cannot cost less 
than $40,000,000 per annum. Then if you should succeed in levying as much as 
$10,000,000 on the people of Mexico, this country will still have, tor supply 
$30,000,000. This experiment, then, should it last one year, will cost this country 
at least $30,000,000 for the support o! the army alone, and still there maybe no trea- 
ty ; and you may be compelled at last to take the indemnity into your own hands, 
that indemnity being New Mexico and California ; for it is under this version of the 
policy of the Administration that I am discussing the question. Well, sir, did it nev- 
er strike honorable Senators who support the Executive in making this experiment 
that, if it should be crowned with complete success, and a treaty should be made 
ceding New Mexico and California to the United States, the whole cost to the 
country will be more than five times the value of the territory ceded ? Sir, I can- 
not suppose that gentlemen so intelligent and as well-informed upon the subject can 
have failed to perceive this consequence, and how preposterous it would be to pur- 
sue such a course of policy, and for such a result. 



10 

I now proceed, in my desultory manner, to notice the arguments of honorable 
Senators in support of this bill, and the proceedings of the General in command in 
Mexico, in further confirmation of the views I have already advanced. The pre- 
sent policy of the Administration and its friends is exceedingly difficult and em- 
barrassing, both to themselves and the country, and they must feel-it to be so. 
While they must necessarily continue to keep the expectation of an early peace 
prominent before the country, their plan of operations on the other hand has a di- 
rectly contrary tendency. While they do not mean to abandon altogether the idea 
of makii;g a treaty -with any government that may spring up in Mexico — for that 
is a resource which may become very convenient — yet their measures are adopted, 
and their operations conducted with reference to the more settled policy of 
encouraging the establishment of a government — a government under the protec- 
tion of our arms — or of holding and governing the country, until by the experience 
of the "justice of our sway,'* as indicated by the honorable chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Military Affairs at the close of his argument, the people of Mexico shall 
be disposed to make such a treaty as the honor of the country demand?. 

The difficulty and embarrassment of the argument in support of the measure 
before the Senate, under such circumstances, are manifest, and it struck me as an 
incident deserving notice, that the distinguished Senator who introduced the bill 
should avail himself of the earliest occasion to say, that he knew no more of the 
policy of the Administration, in the prosecution of the war, than what appears in 
the official documents. Yet, I regarded it as such an avowal as a gentleman of his 
distinction and eminence in the. country might feel himself called upon to make. 
His position in the body is one both delicate and important ; and, whatever his in- 
dividual opinion may be upon some particulars of the policy adopted by the Execu- 
tive department of the Government, he may feel constrained to sanction them. I 
can make many allowances for a gentleman occupying the delicate and important 
relation to the Executive which he now docs, as chairman of the Committee on 
Military Affairs. 

That distinguished Senator, in his speech on this subject, confined himself mainly 
to the views presented in the report of the Secretary of War ; and throughout his 
argument the expectation of an early treaty was never lost sight of, while the 
reasoning employed will be seen to be based upon the idea of continued occupation 
q{ the country. , 

The argument first advanced in support of the measure was, that our army in 
Mexico was in danger. (Mr. Cass shook his head.) I find that I am mistaken. 
The argument then was, that contingencies may arise endangering the army. 
The people of Mexico who have failed to moke an obstinate resistance at the com- 
mencement of the war, may be roused by a protracted invasion to a high degree 
of energy and courage. He announced to us that our army is in the. midst of eight or 
ten millions of a hostile population. This is an argument which appears to me to 
be addressed to our fears, and the popular feeling which may be supposed to exist 
i.'i such an emergency. I cannot say that it is one addressed to the reason and 
judgment of the Senate. I need not say that if any just grounds can be shown to exist 
for supposing that our army is in danger, that there is not a Senator present who 
would not promptly vote, not ten only, but twenty, fifty, or any number of regi- 
ments that might be demanded to ensure its safety. But what are the facts, as to 
the perilous condition of our army? We have now not less than forty-five thou- 
sand troops in all Mexico, and new recruits are still going forward. There are 
not l«Tss than thirty-two thousand men under General Scott: and this is the army 
.-an! to be in danger. 1 desire to make a brief reference to what our troops have 
done, that we may infer what they will or can do. To say nothing of the preced- 
ing brilliant and unsurpasssd achievments of General Taylor, we have se?n him 
at ftuena Vista, with an army of less than five thousand men — of whom not more 
•than six hundred were regulars, and the remainder undisciplined volunteers, who, 
as it has been properly said, had never before heard the report of a hostile gun — 



11 

repulse, with great slaughter, an army of twenty thousand — an army the best discip- 
lined and best appointed that Mexico had been able to bring into the field since the 
beginning of the war, and withal supported by a heavy train of artillery. This 
he did in an open field. If the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglass) were pre- 
sent, I would say that it was a very obstinate proceeding on the part of General 
Taylor not to he willing to be sacrificed ; to bo driven across the Rio Grande, and 
thence home in disgrace. We next see General Scott, with less than twelve 
thousand men, landing at Vera Cnrz in the face of the enemy, attacking and com- 
pelling the surrender of the city, together with the Castle of San Juan de Ulua. 
In a very short time after, we see him with eight thousand troops storming the 
batteries of the enemy, and carrying the heights of Cerro Gordo, defended' by an 
army twelve thousand strong. The fortification of Perote and the city of Puebla, 
with a population of eighty thousand inhabitants, panic stricken, fall before him 
without resistance. After refreshing his troops and receiving some reinforcements, 
we next see Genera] Scott precipitating himself, with an army of not more than 
ten thousand men, upon the valley and- city of Mexico, defended by thirty thousand 
armed men, assaulting and carrying the enemy's works at every point; and after 
a series of sanguinary conflicts, running through several days, with his army re- 
duced to six thousand, capturing by main force the city itself, and triumphantly 
planting the banner of his country upon the so-called palace of the Montezumas. 
At no time during the course of these operations had General Scott more than fif- 
teen thousand troops on his whole line, extending from Tampico to the city of 
Mexico. Upon this tame line he has now an army of thirty-two thousand, well 
provided in every respect. It is under such circumstances that our army is said to 
be in danger. Sir, 1 cannot suppose that the argument upon this point is entitled 
to any weight whatever. 

The next argument submitted in support of this measure is, that, after providing 
for the safely oft lie army, and the continued occupation of our present conquest, it 
is Intended to extend the military operations to such other strongholds and rich and 
populous districts as it may be thought expedient to occupy. Very well ; upon this 
point I regret that the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, 
who is so able, did not favor us with any estimates of the amount of force that, in 
his judgment, would be necessary to hold the large towns and States or districts 
already in our possession. I am surprised that we are furnished with no such es- 
timates from any member of that committee, although there are several distinguish- 
ed Senators on that committee who have been connected with military service. I 
pretend to no competency to make such an estimate. We are left pretty much to 
grope our way in the dark upon this point. Still some data we may glean from 
the reports of the officers of the army connected with the late splendid successes. 
We learn, for example, that Col. Childs held Puebla, which, by some estimates, con- 
tains a population ofeighty thousand, with a force of no more than five hundred, effective 
men, for thirty days and nights, and during a part of that time against the assaults 
of eight thousand troops, commanded by Santa Anna himself. Upon the line ex- 
tending from Tampico to Mexico. I therefore' estimate that five hundred troops will 
fee quite a sufficient protection for Tampico ; one thousand for Vera Cruz, with the 
addition of the marine stationed off that city : for Jalapa five hundred ; as many 
more for Perote ; the same number for Puebla, and two thousand for the city of 
Mexico : in all live thousand men. In this estimate I take into view that wherever 
our army makes its entry it disperses the army of the enemy, captures their artil- 
lery and other munitions of war, and disarms the population, leaving them no 
resource for further resistance. I also take into view that in whatever town or 
city detachments of our army arc stationed, large numbers of our citizens find their 
way there, who, upon any sudden emergency, will be ready to perform military duly. 
I cannot suppose that there are at this moment, in the city of Mexico alone, less than 
a thousand of such auxiliaries, and if we include the teamsters and others, attached 
to the staff of the arm)', a much larger number. 



12 

Then, sir, we have it admitted that Gen. Scott's force is now not less than thirty- 
two thousand men, of all arms, upon his whole line, from Tampico to the city of 
Mexico. Of those let us suppose that some five thousand will be at all times on the sick 
list, or otherwise disabled, still there will remain an effective force of some twenty, 
seven thousand. But let it be taken for granted that the whole effective force at any 
one time will not exceed twenty-five thousand rank and file, you will have a force, 
after deducting the five thousand I have estimated as sufficient to hold your present 
conquests in that quarter, of twenty thousand, which can be moved in columns upon 
whatever other strongholds and populous districts you may think it expedient to seize 
and occupy, and which you announce as your present plan for coercing an early 
peace. 

Well, sir, is not a disposable force of twenty thousand men sufficient for that 
purpose ? When all your past conquests by Gen. Scott have been achieved by a 
force not exceeding fifteen thousand at all points, and now that the armies of the 
enemy have been dispersed, their munitions of war captured or destroyed, their 
financial resources exhausted, shall it be said that a force of thirty-two thousand men 
is not adequate for the further prosecution of the war in the interior of Mexico? 

The honorable Senator, to enforce the argument in favor of the immediate adop- 
tion of the measure under debate, and in pursuance of the policy of raising a reve- 
nue in Mexico for the support of our army, informed the Senate that it was very 
desirable to take and occupy the rich mining States of Zacatecas and San Luis 
Potosi. Well, sir, this argument of the honorable Senator had scarcely escaped 
from his lips when, unluckily, news reached Washington that two columns or di- 
visions of the army were now being organized, and were expected soon to march 
upon these important positions ; and before this news grew cold, and following 
close upon its heels, we are put in receipt of a general order of the commanding 
general to the army to hold itself in readiness to overrun all Mexico. Confident in 
his resources and the sufficiency of the force already in the field, he makes no re- 
ference to reinforcements as expected or desired. To pursue this part of the ar- 
gument a little further, let us suppose Zacatecas and San Luis Potosi are now in 
our possession, and that Queretaro will soon follow ; if you estimate the force ne- 
cessary to hold each of these States as high as two thousand, making six thousand 
in all, you will still have a force of fourteen thousand at your disposal, with which 
you can take and occupy other strongholds of the enemy, keep your communica- 
tions open, and reinforce the divisions of the army at any point which may require 
to be strengthened. 

But, sir, the main object of those extended operations of the army is declared 
to be to cause the pressure of the war to be felt by the whole population, to levy 
contributions, to seize the public revenues into our hands for the support of our 
army, and thus to dispose the minds of the Mexicans to a speedy termination of 
the war by a treaty. Well, sir, even while the argument is pressed by the honora- 
ble Senator upon this point, by another arrival of despatches from Mexico we are 
advised that General Scott has already, under instructions from the Government at 
Washington, issued an order for carrying this branch of its policy, in the further 
prosecution of the war, into effect. But what do we see upon looking into the 
order of Genera! Scott ? By a single stroke of his pen he abolishes the entire 
amount of transit duties and of the taxes exacted at the gates on all supplies to her 
city population — a branch of revenue which has heretofore yielded four and a half 
millions to the Government, and the one of all others felt to be the most burden- 
some and oppressive upon the people of Mexico ! I am aware, sir, that it may be 
said that the revenue thus abolished may be supplied by the increased productive- 
ness of the country, simulated, as it will be, by this salutary exemption ; that the 
revenues from all other sources will be augmented. I am aware, too, that, by 
another order of General Scott, the amount of revenue assessed upon the different 
States is greatly increased beyond the amount exacted under the Mexican Govern- 
ment. But I do not forget, at the same time, that General Scott, in pursuance of 



13 

the policy of the Government at Washington, and looking to a continued occupa- 
tion of the country, has abolished other large sources of revenue. For example: 
lotteries are abolished, and the tobacco monopoly is to cease after this year. The 
proposition is, that the people of Mexico, in the further prosecution of this war, 
are to be made to feel its burdens, and, by the aggravated calamities brought upon 
them by subjecting their resources to the support of our army, to reconcile them to 
a treaty. Hut, instead of increasing their burdens, you relieve the industrial and 
enterprising classes of the inhabitants of a burden which, under their own Gov. 
eminent, they held to be most oppressive. While you declare that your policy is 
to increase the burdens and calamities of the war, you lighten existing burdens. 
Instead of aggravation, your policy is one of conciliation. Instead of causing your 
military occupation to be felt as a grievance, you pursue a course calculated to dis- 
play the beneficence of your sway. The industrial classes embrace a part of all 
<li ■ rarities of race of which the population is compounded; some of pure Indian 
blood ; others of the casts or mixed races, and a considerable proportion of whites, 
and these compose the strength of what is called the Puros, or republican party in 
Mexico. This is the party which your plan of raising a revenue for the support of 
your army tends to conciliate. Yet this is the party which, at every step of your 
progress, from the commencement of the war, has resolutely opposed a treaty. 
They declare that your military occupation, your military government, is prefera- 
ble to the domination of their own factions. The withdrawal of your army is what, 
it is said, they most dread. They want your protection ; the benefits of your free 
institutions, and the support of your power and resources. This, too, is the party 
in Mexico by the aid of which you expect to establish such a Government as can 
gtve you a treaty with the security for the future which you demand. It has been 
proclaimed by the semi-official organs of your own Government, that this party de- 
sire annexation to the United States. You have, then, already taken the first step 
in the policy indicated in the message, and in the debate upon this question, of en- 
couraging the formation of a new Government, to be founded on truly republican 
principles. You are already in alliance with them ; and, inasmuch you say that 
it is your policy, in the vigorous prosecution of the war, to enforce a speedy peace, 
and this Puros party is known to be opposed to a treaty, you may be said to be the 
allies of the public enemy. It was only this morning that I saw it announced in 
the semi-official organ of the Administration published in this 'city, that twenty- 
eight members of the Congress now assembling at Queretaro, of the Puros party, 
have protested against any treaty that may be made with the United States. Such 
are the inconsistencies between your avowed policy at home, and your proceedings 
in Mexico ; inconsistencies necessarily the result of the complex and double policy 
which had been adopted by the Administration. 

Now, sir, am I mistaken in the position that the Administration has abandoned 
the expectation of a treaty with any existing Government in Mexico; and that this 
war is to be prolonged until such a Government is established under your protec- 
tion, as shall be tlble to give you security for the future ? I shall lose the point of 
;nv argument if this is not so ; and I will thankfully listen to any explanation from 
the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, for I intend to build 
upon it. 

The usual hour of adjournment having arrived, it was suggested that the Sena- 
tor should defer the remainder of his remarks till to-morrow. 

Mr. Bell signified that he should be glad to be so indulged. 

Mr. CASS. For myself as an individual member of the Senate, I cansayitwill give me great 
pleasure to extend to the Senator the indulgence which he desires, in the state of his health, to ad- 
journ this drlmt*' till to-morrow, in orde'r to afford him an opportunity to finish his remarks. The 
honorable Senator has ma le two or three allusions in the course of his speech which I cannot but 
Kgard as personal to myself, and it is in reference to them I now desire to snya few words. The 
Senator repeat -tlly challenged contradiction, pausing as though he wished and expected reply. As- 
suming certain ; lets as the basis of his argument, he intimated we knew they were true; but when 
.1 arose to, put the matter right at the moment the error was committed, I found the honorable Sen- 



14 

ator wished to continue his argument, with his facts, as he assumed them, till he had terminated his. 
part of the debate. With a good deal of emphasis the Senator repeatedly asked " What do you 
want!" Addressing Senators on this side of the chamber, he asked "What do you demand from 
'Mexico?" And it really seemed as if he expected one would rise and say that he wanted this, and 
another that he wanted that, and that the whole Senate — both sides of it, I suppose — was to be polled 
in this new kind of canvas?, and to give their opinion and vote respecting the specific terms we 
ought to demand from Mexico. We are engaged in a war with a foreign nation. Its course, so far, 
has been prosperous and glorious, but no human being can predict its consequences, or when or how 
it will terminate. In this state of things ii would be a most extraordinaiy instance of legislative 
imprudence if each member of this body should announce his own plan and policy, and denounce- 
the projects of every other one. But, sir, all that a prudent Senator ought to do would lie to lay 
down certain general principles, such, lor example, as indemnify and security, amplifying his views 
of them as he pleased, without undertaking to specify precisely what ought or ought not to be ac- 
cepted. And if the honorable gentleman had referred to some of my remarks previously made in 
the session, he would have discovered my views of this matter. I distinctly stated that the incipient 
steps of the negotiation were given to the President by the Constitution, and that, though 1 could 
not expect the gentlemen on the other side to have the same confidence in the Executive as myself 
and my friends on this side have, for one I was satisfied, to leave them there, and to content myself 
with investigating the matter when it came before, the Senate, and with voting aye or no upon the 
treaty. It was my view then, and I entertain the same sentiments now. . 

The Senator has made many allusions to the principle laid down by the President, and has em- 
phatically repeated the terms, indemnity and security — security and indemnity, as though they an- 
nounced some new discovery in diplomacy, and asks, in a triumphant tone, what they mean. The 
honorable Senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) had previously made the same inquiry, and he 
also seemed startled as though some new doctrine and practice were to mark our negotiations in 
Mexico. I will not take that honorable gentleman's witty definition, that indemnity means half and 
security the other half, but I will say that if indemnity means half, or whatever else it means, more 
or less, security means certainty and safety for its protection. 

Mr. President : In the modern diplomacy of Europe, for the last three centuries, the principle of 
indemnity and security is as well known and enforced as any other principle of national intercom- 
munication. There are two objects for which security may be demanded, depending upon existing 
circumstances. One has reference to an unstable Government and the other to an intractable hos- 
tile people ; which of these seurities this Government may think it necessary to demand, or whether 
both, and of what nature and extent, it is not for me to determine. These questions are with the 
Executive. There, the Constitution has placed them, and there lam willing to leave them. Does 
the gentleman suppose that this Government will make a treaty without some reasonable prospect 
of its observance, or without adopting the necessary precautions for fidelity and good faith on the 
part of Mexico? When the Allies entered Paris, after the fall of Napoleon, the restored dynasty 
found the feelings of the French nation against them, and their political condition was uncertain 
and tottering. The great Powers, therefore, kept military possession of Paris, and of some other 
portions of France, as security till the new Government could gain strength, and evince a power and 
disposition to comply with their engagements. I merely refer to the fact in illustration of the gene- 
ral principle, and not because I have the slightest knowledge of the nature of the security which the 
Executive means to demand. Many other cases, sir, have happened, and many more may be im- 
agined, in which temporary possession of important positions in a country may have been or may be ' 
necessary, where a feeble Government holds the power,in order to provide, against its fall, if it should 
fall before its engagements are fulfilled. 

Again, with regard to a hostile and intractable. people, it may be necessary to obtain security 
against their unfriendly disposition. An open indefensible country, or a river which may be crossed 
any where, almost from its source to its mouth, may not be regarded as affording propel security 
against border incursions. A range of mountains — a natural barrier may be accessary ', And in 
connection with this topic I will remark; that the resolutions of the honorable Senator from Indiana 
(Mr. Hanmegan) have led me to investigate this subject more narrowly than I had done before, an,d 
I am perfectly satisfied he is, right, and that the Sierra Madre would make the proper boundary be- 
tween us and Mexico on that frontier ; and. as one member of the Senate. I hope this boundary will 
be obtained. That ridge of mountains is an extraordinary one, commencing at the Gulf of Mexico 
and running five or six bun Ired miles to the Paso del Norte, and with not more than five or six 
passes through which man can penetrate it. The rest is an eternal, impenetrable, impassable bar- 
rier — a natural wall which laughs to scorn that of China ; and beyond is the great desert, destitute 
of water, and across which hostile expeditions can be pushed only with great difficulty. A very 
small force would hermetically close these passes through the ridge, and give us full security for our 
indemnity on that side. 

The honorable Senator said he would astonish us with some of his remarks. He has fully redeemed 
his promise, and I confess myself very much astonished 'indeed. He seems to assert as a fact, 
and not to deduce as a conclusion, and calls upon us to contradict itif.it is not so, that the Ad- 
inistration does not desire a peace with the Government of Mexico. 

Mr. Bem,. I did not say that. I said that this Administration had no confidence in the secu- 
rity which any treaty with the existing Government of Mexico could give for future peace, and 



• 



15 



therefore did not desire a peace with any existing Government unless with security, which they 
•did not believe the Government could afford. 

Mr.CaJ®. The gentleman seems to assume as a given fact, and beyond dispute, and bases upon 
it his argument, that the Govemmsnt does not desire a peace. And he stated expressly, that if 
the fact fails, his argument fails with it. Now, sir, I never heard one word of this before. If such 
!"• thttcfcse, the gentleman has penetrarted fax'deepef into tin; recesses of Executive secrets than I 
haxfi done. I bjaUejfe thai theA littintstratiota is not only willing but desirous to make a treaty 
with any Government in Mexico whose authority is recognized there, and to run the risk of 
p'ropei securit) for the maintenance of it. 

Mr. Bell. What security can arty Government which now exists in Mexico give? 
W I v-- We have not yet gOI to that point. No Government iti Mexico has yet made a 
treaty; our difficulty is not in the obserswice of "the stipulations of a treaty, but in its formation. 
To y have utterly refused to enter into any D igotiation with us. It is not that there is an unstable 
Government, but that the Government rejects our oilers. That is the difficulty we havj experi- 
v. ■ -A frorii the < i i aent of the war. 

Mr. Bin. i.. The irery argnmenl I assume is, that ifthey should make a treaty- you would have 

it, as every treaty eontainS.a clause bfamityahd peace. Then I want to know 

whether the bpnoi bl gentleman would consider any treaty by the existing Government of Mex- 

the provinces of New Mexico trad California, as bringing with it "security for the future," 

to hi construction, the phrase implies? And would they rely upon such a treaty 

as'Tjfibrdfng the security I 

Mr. Cas!*, Tile gentleman asks me whether a stipulation for peace and amity would be re- 
gardedaa security ! Why. such a declaration alone would not be regarded as security from any un- 
Goi ' in! 1 1 r Something more wotikl be necessary till its position was more secure. I take 
it For granted that this ^ministration, when it makes a peace with Mexico, should its Government 
then appear' to be unstable, would require some security for the observance of the stipulations of 
the peace. The general principles of security, whether against a Government or a People, I have 
already stated, Their application is with the K'xefcutjve. As to the continuation of the war, sir, 
I ba\ ■ merely to remark chaj we have but one duty,and that is to push our operations as all other 
nations have done, and will do t II an honorable peace is obtained,; There is a point in all wars 
national obduracy must give v/ay, and where submission becomes cheaper than resistance. 
It is when the results of the war Have proclaimed the impossibility of continuing the contest. 
r l!i may seem harsh, but it is founded in human nature. Our true policy is to carry on the war 
with ail our might till its objects are aocomplished. Those objects ought to be just, and we believe 
i ti ms ought not be relaxed by any crude notions of mistaken philanthropy. 
The Mexicans are like all other people. Their point of submission will be found, as that of 
others has b before them. They must eat, and sow, and reap, and wear clothing, and 

preseYve the institutions of social lile ; ami I repeat that their injustice will give way before our 
exertions, if these are continued. 

1 stai ir, thiU 1 have two answers to the honorable Senator from Tennessee. One is, 

that his case is a suppositious ode, and that we have not arrived at the point when it is necessary 
to decide upon the security to be taken, as our offers have been utterly rejected ; and the other is, 
tint, when t in time comes for determining that question, the Executive will no doubt take such 

ity, if security be the] cessary, as-circumstarrces may require. 

One word more. The bouorabl ■■ S ■nator has said that in my opening speech I said I knew no 
■> ■ of the Executive, than was disclosed in the documents. I said nothing like it. 
The honorable Senator is un leran entire nhishpprehension; 
Mr. Bi:i.l. it struck nic with great force, at the Itirfte. 

V] ( '.\ss. I will read what 1 did say: "3 know nothing more, of the proposed plan of cam- 

J in that part of the Report of the Secretary of War which has just been 

rea.l to the Senate." This is what I said, and why! First, because it was true; and secondly, 

ili ■ plan of the Secretary of War was one of the most elaborate and detailed plans 

ibrriitted to the legislative department of a Government. 1 do not see how he could have 

been more particular, unless he had .said that on such a day we should enter Queretaro, on 

. day San Louis, and so on, disclosing every step of the campaign till its objects should 

ui'ii or attained. It was, therefore, as the honorable Senator will perceive, not of the 

nt that I spoke, but o! the plans of the campaign. 

The honorable Senator his spoken of the force which General Scott considers necessary to 

maintain out present command of the country. 

It ,: ; ■ honorable Senator will advert to a document s-mt into the Senate the other day, and 

I think published in the > Intelligencer, he will rind that the force' estimated by General Scott as 

try t'/r this purpose, adding to it I believe one or two expeditions, is thirty thousand men. 

i I of two thousand, which the Senator deems sufficient to hold the city of Mexico, Gen. 

considers a garrison of seven thousand or seven thousand five hundred requisite for that 

.Mr. Btr.r,. I have heard the explanations of the gentleman with a great deal of pleasure, but 
they do no*, satisfy me that my argument has been at all impaired. 



16 



t 



February 3. 
The Senate having resumed the consideration of the Ten Regiment bill — 

Mr. BELL. Mr. President, in the course of the remarks which I had the honor 
to present to the Senate yesterday, I endeavored to show that the Administration 
could not, consistently with their avowed policy, make a treaty with any existing 
Government in Mexico ; and I undertook to show the facts and circumstances on 
which my argument was based. I referred, in the first place, to the grounds on 
which this bill was pressed in this body, and, secondly, to the operations of our 
army itself, as affording evidence that there was no design, no desire to accept 
any treaty from the existing Government; and I called upon honorable Senators 
on the other side of the chamber, if they pleased, in their discretion, to say whe- 
ther that was not their view of the now settled policy of the Administration. I 
put the question distinctly and directly whether a treaty by the existing Govern- 
ment in Mexico, ceding New Mexico and California to the United States, would 
be regarded as satisfactory. I supposed that they would he obliged to answer in 
the negative, upon the ground that, although affording ample " indemnity for the 
past," it did not afford " security for the future," and that these terms were a sub- 
stantive part of the settled policy of the Executive. I further said, what I ob- 
served might be regarded as a bold assertion, that the Administration neither ex- 
pected nor desired a treaty with any existing Government in Mexico. I did not 
say that I would astonish Senators by my remarks, as the honorable Senator rep- 
resented me as having done. The honoraMe chairman of the Committee on Mili- 
tary Affairs says it was true that he was astonished. But when he came to an- 
swer the interrogatory, " Will you accept a treaty from the existing Government 
ceding those territories which you have heretofore admitted to be ample indemni- 
ty ?" he could not answer in the. affirmative. He answered precisely as I supposed 
he was bound to answer. It was for the purpose of bringing out these answers 
that [ submitted fhese inquiries, in a manner which he regarded as going beyond 
the due parliamentary license. My object indeed was to press gentlemen, and 
that gentleman in particular, because he stood at the head of that committee, and 
is supposed to know the policy of the Administration on a question so important as 
the present. He answered, then, in substance, as I supposed he was obliged to 
answer, that they could not take a treaty from any existing Government, or any 
faction which might arise, if no security for future peace was conceded. And 
when the question was further pressed on the distinguished gentleman, " What do 
you mean by security ?" he replied that, his attention had been directed by the reso- 
lutions of the gentleman from Indiana to the Sierre Madre as a proper boundary ; 
but he did not limit his "security" to that line. He went on to speak of the right 
of the conqueror, when the Government of the conquered nation was unsettled — 
"when anarchy took the place of order, and the people were turbulent — to hold pos- 
session of the conquered country as security for futirre peace ; and he referred us 
to the case of the Allied Powers, who had kept military occupation of France for 
a twelvemonth as security for the maintenance of the peace which they had con- 
cluded with the new Government. 

Well, these answers of the honorable gentleman are perfectly natural, rational," 
and consistent with the policy of the Administration; as I understand it. A milita- 
ry occupation of the interior of the country, to some extent, is now contem- 
plated by the admission of the Senator. What portion of the country is to 
be occupied, and how long the occupation is to continue, are, as the distinguished 
gentleman said, things which he could not. now point out, as they were to be gov- 
erned necessarily by contingencies. I shall hereafter show that this is a policy 
from which they can never extricate themselves but by holding the country by right 
of conquest, unless they abandon all that they have done — patch up the best treaty 
they can with the present Government, and under the wings of it flee the country. 
One word, though out of place, in answer to the statement of the honorable chair- 



man of the Committee on Military Affairs that General Scott estimates seven thou- 
sand five hundred as a proper force to be stationed in the city of Mexico. I have 
never seen, sir, the letter of General Scott, which is said to contain these estimates ;- 
but I cannot imagine that such a force at that point would be at all necessary, ex- 
cept as a corps de reserve. — an army of observation, to be employed in the support 
of other divisions of the army engaged in holding the neighboring States. My es- 
timate of a sufficient garrison for the city of Mexico was founded upon the idea 
that all the strongholds, and adjoining and populous States, would be hrst subdued 
and occupied by an adequate force. I cannot believe that General Scott, under 
the circumstances I had supposed, would consider an army of seven thousand five 
hundred necessary to hold a city, large as it is, which he captured with a force re- 
duced to six thousand, and when defended by a force three or four times as numer- 
ous — now that the enemy had neither army nor resources. 

I now propose to resume my argument at the point at which I had arrived when 
the Senate did me the favor to adjourn — the policy of the Government exhibited in 
the orders of General Scott, in carrying out the plan of raising a revenue in Mexico. 

In further support of the views I presented on yesterday, I might have alluded to 
some parts ot" the argument of the gallant and distinguished Senator from Missis- 
sippi, (Mr. Davis.) who spoke several times on incidental points in this debate. 

I remember — I do not see him in his seat now, but I trust I do not misrepresent 
him — that he pressed, with some earnestness, (and, as in all cases- when he has 
addressed the Senate, addressing himself to the feelings as well as the judgment 
of Senators,) the argument that the passage of this bill was necessary to relieve 
broken-down remnants of regiments that had fought through several sanguinary 
actions with the enemy; regiments which had been reduced from eight hundred or 
a thousand men to two or three hundred. But. what I particularly remarked was 
his argument in favor of regulars instead of volunteers. He said that, however 
valuable volunteers might be in action, when an army was in motion, that there 
was no comparison between their value in a protracted military occupation like this 
and regular soldiers. And. as I understood him, he considered that it would be 
chiefly garrison duty to which the army would hereafter be called in Mexico — the 
holding of the conquered towns and fortresses. I noticed this, and bring it to the 
attention of the 1 . Senate for the purpose of showing that the tenor of the argument 
generally on the other side tends to support the views which I hav° advanced. Not 
only is it the policy of the Administration not to make a treaty with the existing 
Government, because they cannot obtain the " security" which they demand, but 
it is to continue the military occupation of the country. 

[Mr. Davis, ot' Mississippi, said in substance, that he disclaimed the idea of an additional mili- 
tary force to fix the limits ot' territorial acquisition, much less to interfere with the political condi- 
tion of Mexico. He wished to increase the army in Mexico so that its visible strength might 
destroy all hope of" successful resistance. His preference to regulars was in reference to garrison 
duty, in holding the necessary posts on lines of communication. He had before spoken of a mili- 
tary line from the Atlantic to the Pacific, along the range of the Sierra Madre. His policy was 
to occupy that line. He was opposed to the permanent occupation of Mexico. He thought that 

II arera, sustained by the new Congress and the new army of Mexico, was competent to make a 
treaty and sui I rovemment against the assaults of faction. We ought to treat with it, and 
he devoutly prayed that we might treat before he (Mr. B.) should close his argument.] 

Mr. Bell. I unite heartily in the prayer of the Senator thnt we may have peace. 
In regard to his remarks I have only to say that there may have been, as I stated 
yesterday, 8 modified policy adopted, and one which would be consistent with the 
line of the Siena Madre as the "security" which they want. But I think this is 
at last a new construction, assumed by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi 
as one satisfactory to him, of the term "security for the future." 

Mr. Davis. Assumed last November a year ago. 

Mr. Bell. He is consistent. Can he answer for other honorable Senators — 
for the Administration of this Government ? For the power which has greater in- 
fluence than he or the Senate too, unless we choose by the united voice of the two 



Houses to control it? Can he answer that he has the concurrence of one-third 
of this body — I mean of those on his side of the chamber? What security will 
such a line give for peace ? The reason why they did not retire to a line twelve 
months ago was that they had no treaty, no peace. They wanted to coerce a 
peace. 

Mr. Downs. I ask the Senator what line he would be willing to accept? 

Mr. Bell. I do not mean any discourtesy, but I beg to inform the Senator that 
before I close my remarks I will state my views upon that point. My argument 
is intended to demonstrate that the Administration is already carrying out their 
policy of holding the country by military occupation until a Government may he 
formed, matured, and strengthened into such a degree of consistency that it will 
be able to give the securities demanded. I may be wrong, however. Sena- 
tors on the. other side of the chamber, it is very obvious, aie not united in 
sentiment upon this subject. Some distinguished Senators who have spoken differ 
with the Administration, if we look at what is said in the message and among 
themselves. And I may say, looking at the immense, magnitude of the question, 
honorable gentlemen may well differ. Tt is a fearful question in some of its aspects. 

Assuming as I do, and I think upon the strongest ground, that the military occu- 
pation of Mexico is to be continued until such a government shall be established 
as shall afford the. desired security, I propose to inquire whether the undertaking 
be practicable. I ask the attention of the Senate to the statement of a few promi- 
nent facts, in relation to the character and condition of the Mexican population, 
collected from the best sources of information within my reach. 

I know a distinguished Senator (Mr. BeS'tott) who is far better informed than 
I am upon this subject, and whose judgment would be entitled to far greater Weight; 
It was my fortune, many years ago, to listen to an argument of that Senator, before 
a different tribunal, in which his familiar and extensive knowledge of the Spanish 
character, their colonial policy, their laws and institutions, was manifest. He 
knows well the materials which now exist in Mexico for forming a government, 
and he knows the obstacles that lie in the way. I trust that we shall yet hear from 
that distinguished Senator, who now sits so much at his ease on the other side of 
this chamber, upon this subject. 

The best informed differ in their estimates of the population of Mexico. Some 
rate it at eight or ten millions, and others as low as seven millions. I assume 
eight millions as the medium. Of the eight millions there are probably not less 
than five millions of Indians of pure blood ; two millions of what are denominated 
the castes or mixed races, consisting of mestizos, mulattoes, and zombos, who rank 
in society in the order in which I have mentioned them ; and one million of the 
Spanish or white race. Between these several races or castes there exists a re- 
ciprocal antipathy, amounting to contempt on the one side, and jealousy and hatred 
on the other. A white skin is still, as at the period of the conquest, a patent of 
nobility, and just in proportion to the mixture of the blood of the white man which 
flows in the veins of the several castes, do they assert a superiority over all below 
them. The antipathies and jealousies founded on the distinction of races appear, 
from all history, to be deeply seated in natural causes and principles. In Mexico 
these natural causes were strengthened and fostered by the jealous policy of the 
Spanish monarchy.* The laws and institutions of the. vice regal government of the 
colonies cultivated and promoted the natural antipathy and hatred between the In- 
dian and the white and mixed races, as a means of maintaining the dominion of 
the parent country against the influence and ambition of the Spanish creole popu- 
lation, which were always a subject of serious alarm to the Spanish monarch. But 
the emancipation of Mexico from the dominion of Spain appears to have wrought 
but little change in the general condition or the disposition of the several castes or 
races towards each other. At the breaking out and during the revolution, the 
Spanish race, from motives of policy, conciliated the castes or mixed races by ab 
lowing them a higher grade in society ; but, except the cultivated class among the 



19 



no 
ha- 



mixed races, they still rank below the white race. Of this compound mass of 
population, the white race now, as at all times, are the real lords of the country; 
asserting the natural superiority of their race, and controlling all others. They, 
together with the cultivated portion of the mixed race, are also the- holders of 
nearly all the property of the country. The higher clergy, the military, and high 
civil functionaries, are all taken from this class; and, in the practical operation of 
the Mexican Government, the clergy and military constitute a privileged class. 
They are such by the legal exemptions which they enjoy. The castes or mixed 
race are next in degree of influence and importance, both in social and political 
relations; but, with the exception of the cultivated few among them, they are a 
degraded class. But it is the vast Indian population which most demands our at- 
tention. They are as they have been for three centuries — a degraded, dependant, 
melancholy race ; poverty stricken, ignorant ; a living but inanimate mass of hu- 
man beings : outcasts in their own land, taking no interest in public affairs, though 
recognised as freemen by the Mexican constitution; their religion a mummery, 
and even, it is said, in many districts indulging their ancient superstitions ; resi- 
ding in separate villages, and cultivating a small allotment of land in common. 
Such is their general condition, especially in the populous States of the South. Un- 
til the period of the revolution they were in a state of pupilage, and not allowed 
by law to contract debts beyond the small sum of three dollars. They were, ior 
the reasons 1 have before stated, kept in a state of rigorous seclusion — no white 
man being by law permitted to $ettle in their villages. From this, I admit, very 
imperfect description of the condition of the different races which compose the 
population of .Mexico, it will lie readily granted that there is, there can be, no sym 
palhy — no common ties to unite them ; there can be no unity, no individuality, n< 
nationality, no equality of social condition ; but, on the contrary, irreconcileable ha 
treds and jealousies. Yet such are. the materials out of which it is pioposed to con 
struct a government upon the principles of republican equality ; such a government 
as will hereafter stand against all the assaults of faction. But I have not stated all 
obstacles to such a scheme. In no country of the world is there so great a degree 
of inequality in the distribution of property. Even among the white race this ine- 
quality stands out as a prominent feature in their relative condition. This of itself 
is a great obstacle, and you must resort to confiscation and banishment to secure a 
settled Government founded upon equal rights and privileges. 

Again, sir, when you shall attempt to regenerate and enlighten the Indian masses, 
you wiil have to encounter the inconvenience of twenty different languages, now 
spoken in different States and districts of Mexico. 

There is another circumstance in the condition of Mexico which, to my mind, 
presents an insuperable barrier to the policy of founding or sustaining the sort of 
Government which seems to be contemplated; the only sort of Government which 
our system will tolerate. Besides the want of all affinity and sympathy between 
the different castes, and the inequality in their social conditions, even the better 
informed classes, in the. march of mind, iu intellectual development, are centuries 
in the rear of the like classes in most of the States of Europe and of this conn- 
try. The overweening influence of the hierarchy, of the higher clergy, in matters of 
Government concern, and the despotism which prevails in the religion of Mexico, 
are at orice the evidence, and may be the cause, of this intellectual inferiority. I 
say nothing of the Romish Church, as to its orthodoxy or otherwise. It m/iy be 
the trues! and purest of the sects ; it may lie the true primitive or apostolic faith ; 
with this 1 have nothing to do; but it is remarkable that, from the days of Luther 
to this day, wherever Protestantism has most prevailed, there you find planted 
deepest and strongest the seeds and the grow lis of civil liberty; and I affirm that 
where there, is no freedom of religious inquiry, no religious toleration, there has 
been no such resurrection of mind as qualities the inhabitants for the enjoyment of 
a free and equal Government. 



20 

But it is said this party of the Puros, which I have already noticed, embracing a 
large class — the industrious and enterprising of all the different castes, the ranchero 
or small proprietor, the artisan and the merchant, including the muleteers, said to 
be respectable for their honesty, and the professions, altogether combining a large 
share of intelligence — are friendly to the present policy of this Administration, and 
that with the aid and through the instrumentality of their chiefs or leaders you can 
build up a Government. It is with this party in Mexico, as I have already shown, 
that you are in some sort in alliance. And I now assert that you cannot take an- 
other step in this policy with safety and honor ; that from the moment of your en- 
trance upon the next stage of progress in the execution of this policy, you will be 
committed beyond retreat. No, sir, the moment you compromise this party by 
calling their chiefs and representatives together for the purpose of forming a new 
government, you are irrevocably bound to the policy of a continued military oc- 
cupation. You expose them to the never-dying hostility and resentment of every 
other interest and faction in Mexico ; of the heirarchy, who fear the overthrow of 
their religion ; of the large landed proprietors and the military, who fear the ex- 
tinction of their long-enjoyed power and influence ; and if there be any remains of 
the ancient Castilian pride and spirit in the country, it will be roused to indignant 
and inextinguishable opposition to those of their own countrymen who may lend 
themselves to the project of forming a Government under the protection of foreign 
bayonets. No, sir, when you shall have once committed yourselves fully othis policy, 
in conjunction with the Puros, you can never abandon them. It would be perfidi- 
ous and disgraceful to do so. The civilized world would cry out against you, should 
you leave them to the vengeance of their powerful enemies. 

But, if you allow no force to this argument, when you shall have constituted this 
new Government under the protection of your armies, how long is the experiment 
of its stability to be continued? When will you know that you may safely with- 
draw 3'our army ? How long is it supposed your nurture will be required, before 
you can leave your bantling to stand alone? When all shall be quiet, when there 
shall be no hostile array in the country ? Does any one doubt that, from the mo- 
ment when your armies shall have overrun the whole country, and every strong- 
hold and large city shall be occupied by your garrisons ; when the present hostile 
chiefs shall have found that further resistance will be fruitless against your over- 
whelming forces, that they will retire to their estates and submit to your authority ? 
Then all will be peace ; but will they carry with them no slumbering spirit of re- 
sentment ; no fierce determination of resistance and revenge, to be stirred into 
action the moment you shall fancy that all is safe, and you shall withdraw your 
forces ? Do you consider the race with which you have to deal ? They are the 
descendants in part of the Celtiberians, who are said, in ancient history, never to 
have sighed in death — the terror of the armies of Rome, and who, in the defence 
of Numantia, their last remaining fortress, preferred perishing by famine, to sub- 
mission to Roman aggression ; in part, of the Suevi and Visigoths, who finally 
crushed that collossal Power. They are Spaniards, who walk the streets and high- 
way, carrying the stiletto under their sleeve, the dagger under the folds of their 
cloaks, and bide their time. The race has deteriorated ; but still blood will show 
itself, at the distance of centuries, when the cup of bitterness overflows, and when 
the oppressor least expects it. 

I have inquired how long this experiment of establishing a stable Government 
in Mexico, by military occupation, is to continue ; and if it will not be regarded as 
too great a descent from higher considerations, I would now inquire what is to be 
the cost of this experiment? Does any one imagine that a less period than from 
three to five years will be sufficient to overcome all the obstacles which now exist 
to a settled Government in Mexico ? I maybe told that after one or two years the 
army of occupation may be safely reduced one-half, or to a force of twenty-live 
thousand. But this must depend upon contingencies. I have already stated that 
an army of fifty thousand men cannot be supported in Mexico at a less annual cost 



21 

than $40,000,000. I have also supposed that, after you shall have subdued all 
the States to your authority, and with the assistance of your navy you blockade her 
ports, you may derive a revenue of $10,000,000 from Mexico. This will leave an 
annual cost to this country of $30,000,000 for the army alone, until the force in 
Mexico can be safely reduced. But the honorable chairman of the Cummittee on 
Military Affairs, in giving his views of the impoitance of occupying the mining 
districts of Zacateeas and San Louis Potosi, informed us that he had received as- 
surances from a distinguished officer in Mexico that a revenue might lie derived 
from these States so large that he would decline stating the amount lest it should 
he deemed incredible. And this is the mode by which this country is to be recon- 
ciled to the military occupation of Mexico for a scries of years. Why, one would 
ho led to suppose that the army had nothing to do but to seize, the mines, and that 
they would find the silver and gold already separated from the ore, and in marvel- 
lous quantities ; or that the mines could continue to be wrought by the proprie- 
tors, and all the product* be handed over to our collecting officers. But docs not 
etery Senator know that the mining of the precious metals is conducted with im- 
mense cost, and that all that the Government or the army can exact cannot exceed 
a rate which will leave a due profit to the proprietors. You surely do not mean to 
employ your officers and soldiers in working the mines. From the grasping 
character of the Mexican Government, to say nothing of its necessities, it may 
well be supposed that the produce of the mines was taxed at the highest rate it 
could bear ; and I have never seen an estimate of the amount of revenue drawn from 
that source, including the tax on coinage, which exceeds two millions, including 
the transit duly. The gross annual product of the mines in all Mexico does not 
exceed $20,000,000, and twenty per cent, on $20,000,000 would be one-fifth, the 
highest assessment levied by the Government of Spain in the days of the Vice- 
Regal Government. In addition to the revenue derived from this source, if you 
should succeed in reviving the foreign trade of the country, continue the blockade 
of all the ports of Mexico, and keep the communication with the interior open, you 
may derive $G, 000. 000 from the customs. Besides these, you can collect $3,000,000 
in direct taxes. Thus, after abolishing the tobacco monopoly, the internal duties, 
and lotteries, and surrendering the remaining sources of revenue to the States or 
local Governments, which in pursuance of the policy of the Administration you 
have already done, $11,000,000 will be the highest amount of revenue you can 
expect to derive for the support of your army, and this only after you shall have 
overrun and occupied all the States. At this time, supposing that you have reduc- 
ed Zacateeas, San Louis Potosi, and Queretaro to your authority, you are in pos- 
session of ten States, and, if Chihuahua is to be included, eleven. General Scott, 
by his financial regulations in Mexico, has imposed upon the several States in 
Mexico $3,000,000, payable monthly by the States occupied by our army. At this 
rate, $1,000,000 may be derived from the eleven States now in our power within 
a year. You may be receiving $2,000,000 from the customs and $500,000 from 
nil other sources of revenue not abandoned or surrendered to the States. Thus, 
the whole amount of revenue, after all your brilliant successes, you are now in the 
receipt of, in pursuance of the policy of compelling Mexico to pay the expense of 
the military occupation of the country, does not exceed the rate of $3,500,000. 

But, Mr. President, these are mere speculations, and, after all, of little impor- 
tance to the country. This question involves higher consaquences. By the time 
you shall have perfected your financial regulations in Mexico, and long before you 
shall have given such strength and power to the new Government you propose to 
erect; long before you shall see the day when you can safely withdraw your army 
from Mexico, with the securities' you desire, a new element of control will have 
intervened ; a new and potent influence will have sprung up to set all your plans 
at naught. Sir, the moment it shall become your known and settled policy to con- 
tinue the armed occupation of Mexico ; that you propose to occupy all the large 
towns with a competent force to ensure tranquility ; that you intend to extend your 



22 

protection to the highways and all other channels of trade and intercourse, and that 
this military protection is to endure for a series of years, as it must endure, what 
must be the inevitable consequence ? A current of immigration will set towards 
Mexico from this country, as irresistible as the torrent of Niagara. The youthful, 
ardent, and enterprising classes of this country, attracted by the thousand rumors 
which go forth of the untold wealth of the Mexican mines ; of the wide and yet 
unoccupied field for successful enterprise in every branch of industry, will soon 
spread themselves over the whole country. . They will become proprietors of" 
the soil ; under the guaranty of the new Government of your formation, they 
will become agriculturalists, establish factories, and become the most useful and 
productive class in the country. They will sand for their families, or form family 
connexions with the native white population. Yes, sir, before two years shall have 
passed in the execution of your present policy, hundreds of thousands of your own 
citizens will have become domiciled in Mexico. Your citizen soldiers, too, will 
have become reconciled to a permanent residence in the land their arms have 
conquered. They, too, will have contracted ties and obligations which they will 
not be willing to abandon. Then, when you shall suppose that the time has come 
when you can safely withdraw your army, a cry of remonstrance will come up 
from Mexico, such as will iind an echo, a lively sympathy at home, in the hearts of 
tens of thousands who now imagine that no necessity can ever arise strong 
enough to reconcile them to the subjugation of the whole of Mexico. These in- 
fluences will be i'elt in all the departments of the Government ; they .'-ill he felt in 
this chamber. It will not be the Puros only, but it will be your own countrymen 
who will call upon you to save them, their families, and their property from the 
resentment, oppression, and spoliation of the powerful factions which will be 
ready to spring up and overturn the new Government. That " force of circum- 
stances," so often and so significantly alluded to in this debate, will then acquire 
tenfold power over the sentiments and opinions of the people of this country, and 
over the public councils. It was heretofore strong enough to impel you to the 
policy of continuing this war, by carrying your arms to the heart of Mexico, and 
then to engage you in the plan of creating a new Government ; and it will at last 
impel you, with far greater reason, to hold the permanent sovereignty of the whole 
country by right of conquest. 

This, sir, will be the last act in the great political drama we are now enacting. 
This is to be the consummation of the policy already shadowed forth in the message. 
This is not merely a nascent policy ; it exists not in embryo only ; I have attempt- 
ed to show that it has germinated already. That it is not merely a vague, floating 
idea in the brain of the President, will fully appear from the message. I beg 
leave to read a' few passages from it. After alluding to the probable " insecurity of 
the present Government in Mexico," and suggesting that it may become proper to 
give "assurances of protection to the friends of peace in Mexico, in the establish- 
ment and maintenance of a new republican government of their own choice," and 
thus converting the " war which Mexico has forced upon us into an enduring bles- 
sing to herself/' the President concludes what he had to say upon this part of the 
suhject in this significant language : 

"If, after affording this encouragement and protection, and after all the persevering and sincere ef- 
forts we have made, from tiie moment Mexico commenced the war, and prior to that time, to adjust 
our differences with her, we shall ultimately fail, then we shall have exhausted all honorable means in 
pursuit of peace, and must continue to occupy her country with our troops, taking the full measure 
»f indemnity into our own hands, and must enforce the terms which our honor demands." 

What " the taking of the full measure of indemnity into our hands" points to, 
whoever now doubts cannot be influenced by any reasoning it is in my power to 
employ. 

But it is not the President only who appears to have looked to the permanent ac- 
quisition of all Mexico as the probable result of the policy now pursued in the 
prosecution of the war. I have in my hands a copy of a letter addressed by the 



23 

Secretary of State, (Mr. Buchanan,) upon this subject, to a public meeting in 
Philadelphia, in which he sums up the views upon the war question in the follow- 
ing language : 

" The capital of Mexico is now the hindquarters of our conquering army ; and yet, such is the 
genius of our free institutions, that, for the first time, its peaceful and we II -disposed citizens enjoy 
Security in their private rights, and the advantage of a just and firm government. From all that can 
be learned Ujey appreciate our protection at its proper value, and dread nothing so much as the with- 
drawal of oifr army. They know this would be the signal for renewed and fit-ree dissensions among 
their military leaders, in which the .Mexican people would become the victims. In this wretched con- 
dition of affairs justice to them and to ourselves may require that we should protect them in estab- 
liahiug.upi a a permanent basis, a republican government, able and willing to conclude and maintain 
an equitable treaty of peace with the United States. Alter every effort to obtain such a treaty, should 
we finally fail in accomplishing the object, and should the military tactions i.i Mexico still persist in 
watxin^' upon us a fruitless war, then we must fulfil the destiny which Providence may have in store 
for both countries. 

" In any event, we owe it to the glories of the past, to the duties of the present, and the hopes of 
the future, never to faker in the vigorous! prosecution of this war until we shall have secured a just and 
honorable peace. The people of the United States will act upon this determination as surely as tkat 
indomitable perseverance in a righteous cause is a characteristic of our race.'' 

But other powerful and influential supporters of the Administration have also 
furnished pregnant and alarming evidences that this idea of conquering and hold- 
ing till Mexico has been largely entertained. Need I referto the resohiliou intro- 
duced into this body by my friend the Senator from Indiana, (Mr. Hannegas,) or 
to the resolution on the same subject introduced by the Senator from New York, 
(Mr. Dickinson?) They speak fur .themselves. 

There are others who have spoken upon this subject too prominent in the coun- 
try to be passed over without notice here. I allude to opinions expressed by officers 
%f the army. I have understood that a letter has appeared in one of the public 
journals of the country, from a distinguished and gallant general recently returned 
from Mexico, (General Quitman,) in which he expressed himself favorably to this 
policy. I would be sorry to misrepresent this distinguished officer, for I have a 
high respect both for his patriotism and his intelligence ; and if I am in error, and 
any honorable Setoator has it in his power to set me right, I will thank him to do 
so. Another gallant and distinguished general, (General Shields,) I observe, has 
expressed the sentiment, on a public convivial occasion, that the Whigs are "war- 
ring against a high and indomitable necessity." 

The distinguished and able chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs has 
told us that although he does not anticipate the annexation of all Mexico, yet that 
he sees nothing so alarming in such a result. I could multiply the proofs, beyond 
the patience of the Senate to listen to, that this gigantic scheme of annexation has 
been gravely considered and found favor with the Administration, if it be not its 
settled policy. But, sir, whatever may be the real views of the President and his 
Cabinet upon the subject, I have, I think, conclusively shown that the inevitable 
tendency and results of the policy they advocate, and which is now in full progress 
in Mexico, is and will be its subjugation. Considering this point established, it 
becomes a duty of the last importance to consider now — I say now, -while we have 
it in our power to control the future issues of this war — what we. shall do with all 
Mexico when it is annexed to the Union? Yes, sir, I repeat the question — what 
will you do with it ? Will you annex it in the form of States ? Let us see what 
will be the consequences of such a procedure. The several States or provinces of 
Mexico, twenty-one in number, now enjoy a separate political organization, with 
sufficient population in each to form a State under our system, except two. These 
may be well merged into one ,• which would still leave twenty new States to be ad- 
mitted into the Union, besides the territories, by a single legislative fiat. By the 
constitution f the United States you are bound to guaranty a republican form of 
government to any new State admitted into the Union. Well, sir, besides three 
millions of the white and mixed races, there will be in the twenty States of Mexico 
a population of five millions of Indians of the pure aboriginal stock. They are 



24 

freemen by the present laws and constitution of Mexico. What will the spirit of 
progressive domocracy, which now exercises so large an influence in this country, 
prescribe as to them ? Would it not claim for them the enjoyment of the right of suf- 
frage ? Is it not the genius of this new and enlarged system of political philosophy to 
inculcate fraternal union upon the most perfect equality with all mankind ? But sup- 
pose this point waved, and that it shall be determined to suspend the political rights 
and privileges of the Indian for a time ; still, upon the principles of our own establish- 
ed system, you must permit them to be represented in the National Legislature. 
They are freemen, of a race superior to the African, and you cannot deny to the 
States of which they compose a majority of the population this right. Then, assum- 
ing one hundred thousand as the ratio of representation, you will have eighty new 
members added to ths House of Representatives ; fifty of whom will represent an 
Indian population alone. But it is the Senate that I may congratulate upon the 
largest addition to its present dignity and importance. We shall have forty new 
Senators ; and as the mixed races of Mexico are, by habit and by a just tribute to 
mental superiority, admitted to an equality of social and political privileges, it is to be 
hoped that we shall always have a portion of the new Senators of this caste, who, by 
the novelty of their complexion, will give new interest and attraction to this body. 
W'hy, sir, at this rate of advance in our schemes of national aggrandizement we shall 
be subject to great changes of every description. This Capitol will be f und to have 
been projected upon quite too limited and narrow a view of our destiny. We shall 
have to dispense with it, and rear one commensurate with the grandeur of our system : 
or, rather, it will soon become expedient to centralize the national metropolis. 

But, sir, you hesitate ; you recoil from this view of the subject ; you turn aside 
from this picture, and say you will adopt a policy less revolting to the popular feel- 
ings and judgment ; that for a time, al least, you will hold Mexico in the form of terri- 
tories or provinces subject to your regulation ; that in this mode you will govern Mexi- 
co until by i in migration there shall be such an infusion of the white race in all the pro- 
vinces as to secure to them the superiority of numbers and influence; and then you can 
adopt them into the Union as States, upon an equal footing with the present States. Bui 
you will still have five millions of Indians on hand, to be an ever-eating canker on your 
system. V\ hat will you do with these ? They must have space ; you must leave them 
their villages and commons; you cannot drive them into the Pacific on the one side, or 
into the Gulf on the other. You cannot exterminate them; you will not be more cruel 
than the Spaniards. You say that you will take them under your tutelage; that you 
will enlighten them, commencing with your military officers and soldiers as their first 
teachers, and the bayonet for the rod of discipline; that you will stimulate this inani- 
mate mass into life and energy by the influences of trade — by giving them the benefits 
of just and equal laws ; that you will thus gradually induct them into the knowledge 
and duties of free institutions, and that, after the lapse of a few generations, you may 
hope they will be qualified to enjoy all the privileges of the white race. A happy ter- 
mination to this beneficent scheme! But all history, all experience, is against it. 

There is another consideration deserving attention, though of less importance, when 
you shall have resolved upon holding Mexico as an appendage or subject province or 
provinces. What will you do with the public debt of Mexico, which is said to be now 
$100,000,000, $60,000,000 of which is due to foreign creditors? Will you repudiate it ? 
If you do vou may bring an old house down upon your heads. Will you seize and con- 
fiscate the properly and estates of the clergy ? It is said the higher clergy have a great 
amount of debt against the large proprietors of mines and other estates, secured by 
mortgages. 1 have heard it estimated as high as $170,000,000. I have it also upon 
good authority that thePuros party, in conjunction with which you propose to establish 
a new Government, have long contemplated, as one of their objects in aspiring to power, 
the confiscation of those debts to pay the public debt of the country, and to appropriate 
the remainder to the construction of roads and other works of general utility. Will you 
carry out this policy when you shall assume the absolute dominion of Mexico ? If you 
do, what will you say"? How will you excuse yourselves to the new Pope of Rome 
and Bishop Hughes ? These are troublesome questions, but I trust that Senators will 
see that they deserve consideration. 

Permit me now, sir, to call the attention of the Senate to some of the further conse- 
quences which may attend this scheme of conquest and annexation. When it shall be 



25 

known in Europe that you have solemnly decided upon the policy of extending your do- 
minion overall Mexico, will there be no disposition among the large and powerful States 
of that continent to interpose and prevent the consummation of your magnificent scheme 
of national aggrandizement? Upon this point, I would respectfully inquire of the 
•chairman of the Commitieeon .Military Affairs if the disposition of foraigu courts has 
been sounded on this subject? I can ha'dly suppose that it has not been done. It may 
and probably will be said that we will permit no interference of any foreign Power; 
that they have no right to interfere, and the moment such a movement is made the whole 
population will rise up to resist the audacious, attempt. Still, sir, the great Powers of 
Europe my choose to interfere. 1 do not think they will, for several reasons. Great 
Britain, with her large colonial possessions on our northern border, and her commercial 
interests and ascendancy, will have most cause to watch our career of conquest ; but 
still she, with the other monarchies of Europe, may look on in quiet complacency, 
shrewdly supposing that we may, in our extravagant attempts on all Mexico, do for our- 
selves the worst that their united arms could do, and with far less cost to them ; that 
the subjugation of Mexico will be a perpetual drain upon our resources, and reduce in- 
stead of adding to our present rank as a military Power. Perhaps, to®, they may indulge 
the expeciaiiun that in the mad career we are entering upon, that model system of free 
representative government — that mirror system established in America, which has so long 
reflected back upon Europe an image of freedom and prosperity and happiness, so seduc- 
tive yet so dangerous to themselves, will be broken in pieces, never more to be recon- 
structed. 

There are other reasons, however, which may control the councils of Europe. They 
have their troubles at home. England has her Ireland, France her Algeria, to tax their 
resources and hold them iu check. France, in a period of no little agitation, and with a 
population which the consummate skill and statesmanship of Louis Philippe has failed 
to unite, is on the eve of entering upon the experiment of a regency under the reign of 
a minoriiy prince. England and France are jealous of each other, and both look with 
fearful apprehension to the designs of the Autocrat of the north — the great Northern 
Bear, who only waits the embroilment of those two Powers with each other, or with 
America, to stretch forth one of his huge paws to draw to his strong embrace thedomin- 
ionsof the Grand lurk, and with the other to grasp British India, with an internal ca- 
pacity still remaining sufficient to ingulph all Europe, as occa«ion mav offer. 

Still, sir, England and France, disregarding all other considerations, mav conclude 
that their commercial and other interests require them to unite in a forcible interference 
with a policy which looks to the establishment of an unlimited dominion upon this con- 
tinent ; and it becomes us to estimate the consequences of such a determination on. 
their part. The war in which we shall then be engaged will not be confined to the 
land ; it will be an ocean warfare also. To meet their united naval armament of a 
thousand ships of war we must enlarge our own naval establishment in a corresponding 
degree. When Mexico shall find such allies — when the disciplined legions of the com- 
bined enemy shall be brought to her assistance on land, instead ol fifty we shall be cal- 
led on to send one hundred thousand troops to Mexico, and have as many more to de- 
fend our sea coast, then extending from the mouth of the Oregon to the Gulf of Tehuan- 
tepec on the Pacific, and from the Bay of Honduras to the Bay of Fundy on the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Atlantic. Who shall estimate the cost of maintaining such armaments, 
both by sea and land, as it would then be incumbent upon 5 ou to supply ? To say that 
a hundred millions per annum would cover the cost of such a war would be under rather 
than over the mark. And where will be your resources when your foreign commerce 
shall be annihilated ? Sir, it may be wise and patriotic to speak of foreign interference 
as an event to be defied, but it is also the part of wisdom to consider that it is possible, 
if not probable, and to make our account accordingly. I know, sir, Senators may ex- 
claim, who dreams of such a result as a foreign interference, as a war with England and 
France! Who, sir, ought not to dream of such results when they understand the ten- 
dency of our present policy in regard to Mexico? And how often has it happened that 
the greatest misfortunes have belallen a country because her statesmen have failed to 
dream in time of the dangers which impended over it. 

1 must say, sir, upon this subject of foreign intervention, that the course of this Gov- 
ernment is any thing but conciliatory towards the Powers of Europe. At a moment when, 
you have already seized upon New Mexico and California, and declared your intention 
never to surrender them, and when at the same time you are preparing to grasp all 
Mexico, you proclaim to the world your determination to allow no transatlantic Power 
to acquire any further foothold in America. While, by this declaration, you announce 
what may pass as a sound policy, by your practice you take away all merit from the 



26 

motive. You will suffer no other Power to add to their dominion by taking advantage 
of the feeble and distracted condiiion of the iStates of Spanish origin, while you claim 
the privilege to despoil them at discretion. You will have no partners in the woik of 
territorial spoliation ; you claim a monopoly of the spoil and plunder of America. 

I now propose, Mr. President, to address myself to another branch of the subject. 
What will be the effect of subjugating all Mexico, and holding it in the form of Stales 
or as dependant provinces upon our system of govt 1 rnmeni, our free institutions ? 

The distinguished Senator from South Carolina showed a great deal ol hardihood, or 
rather that he is a statesman of a by gone age, when he broached the obsolete idea of 
executive patronage and the duty of keeping it in just and reasonable limits, even with 
our present extent of territorial power and dominion. Who can now speak of the sub- 
ject of patronage without being thought far in the rear of the times? ^ by, sir, does 
not the distinguished Senator know that, from the moment when the doctrine of pro- 
scription could be openly avowed, and the right of the ruling party to the exclusive en- 
joyment of the offices and honors of the country was rigorously practised by one great 
party, and the justice and propriety of the policy, sustained by a large portion of the 
other, a final extinguisher was applied to all hope of limiting the patronage of this Gov- 
ernment upon any old fashioned notion of economy ? Yes, sir, I remember the time, 
since my entrance into public life, when the cry of proscription, of retrenchment, and re- 
form was potent enough with the people of this country to overturn an Administration 
distinguished alike for its economy, honesty, and ability. 

But, sir, we should not despair of resisting success ully the avalanche of power and pat- 
ronage which now threatens to overwhelm us. Let us inquire for a moment what will 
be the amount of patronage which will accrue to the Executive when Mexico shall be 
added to our domain, and laid off into separate territories or provinces. 

We shall have not less than twenty four new and distant territorial or provincial gov- 
ernments, each of which must have a governor — twenty-lour governors— and as many 
secretaries to their excellencies ; then the judicial corps in each province of two or three 
judges, an attorney general, and a marshal; then will follow collectors of customs, at 
numerous ports 0:1 the Pacific and on the Gulf of Mexico; the directors of nine public 
mints; then, lor a period at least, we must have a military chief of a grade not lower 
than a general commanding t.he forces in each province; and last, though not least, a 
governor general for all Mexico- Why, sir, John liull need not swell himself out, and 
vaunt himself so lusti y any longer. We, too, shall have our Indies ; our subject millions; 
our rich provincial governments; our large standing army; and though we may not 
boast an empire on which the sun never sets, yet will it soon extend from the Line to the 
frozen seas of the north. V\ ith such prospects of extended dominion, what visions of 
national grandeur and magnificence may we not indulge? Then such magnificent scenes 
as we shall behold at this seat of our great republican empire, and all over the country; 
generals returning from the distant provinces laden with wealth and honors, making their 
triumphal progress through the country, and suing for the consulship; troops of appli- 
cants for office of an inferior grade. V\ hat gorgeous spectacles shall we behold on levee 
occasions at the W.hite House, or rather the imperial palace; what a glitter of epauletts; 
what a clatter of dangling swords; what a waving and diffing of red and white plumes! 
But all this will be iclipsed on presentation day ; when the twenty-four new governors 
shall attend to kiss hands, and lake their departure for their distant provinces. Sir, the 
imagination fires at the thought. 1 already see the grand usher or master of ceremo- 
nies leading in the successful applicants, and hear him saving to the President, "This, 
sir, is the gentleman whom your Excellency has had the goodness to nominate as gov- 
ernor of the Californias, this of Sonora, this of Sinaloa, this of Guanaxuato, this of Ja- 
lisco, this of Oaxaca, this of Midoacan, Chiapas, Yucatan, Queretaro, Taniaulipas, New 
Leon,'' and so of the rest. " And I have the proud satisfaction lo announce to your Ex- 
cellency that the. august Senate confirmed the nominations of all these gen'lemen with- 
out the slightest inqu ry into their fiitjess, having the most unbounded confidence in the 
unerring judgment and long tried patriotism of your Excellency in all that pertains to 
your illustrious station." 

Well sir, this will be a proud occasion. And then, sir, what limits can be set to our 
growing greatness ? We shall have a railway uniiing the- city of Washington to the 
city of Montezuma — 1 insist, sir, that the name of Mexico be changed to that of Monte- 
zuma — the two capitals of the United Empire. This shall be our Rome, and if the 
Lake Tezcuco can be converted into a strait, Montezuma shall be our Constantinople. 

Well, sir, do honorable Senators think that we can stand all this more than imperial 
spleiMlor, without danger to the constitution and the liberties of the country ? Why, sir, 
the prize of the Presidency is alieady so great that iv>.ry succeediug electio.: Lhreatans 



27 

to convulse our system. Who does not remember the excitement which pervaded the 
whole country in our mure recent Presidential elections — an excitement so intense that 
society could bear no more ? But when we shall have a standing army of fifty thousand 
men; when our empire shall be enlarged to the contemplated limits; when the whole 
country shall have been intoxicated by this passion for distinction and glory, personal 
and national; when the Presidential purple with its present power and patronage, pre- 
senting a temptation almost too gre^t for virtue, shall receive this vast accession of 
strengih and influence; when, iiistead of twenty or thirty, the President can annually 
dispense a hundred millions among his partisans and followers, who shall say that our 
institutions will he in no danger? Sir, public liberty will be extinct. But we may con- 
sole ourselves with the reflection that the forms of the republic will still be preserved. 
The republic in ruin will still flourish in name; ours will still be denominated the great 
republic. Bui what are forms and what is a name ? The Roman republic long survived 
the crushed liberties of the people of Rome. Augustus and his immediate successors 
carefully observed all the forms of the ancient constitution. Consuls were elected; the 
Senate continued to debate and register decrees, fancying itself still a constituent element 
of the government long after every vesiige of real power had departed from it forever. 
But Senators say there is no danger ol a similar result to our system, whatever policy 
we shall adopt in relation to Mexico; and so they goon, in the execution of their present 
policy, to whatever it may lead. 

And this is destiny ! It is dearth! This is to he the triumph of progressive democ- 
racy. Sir, I am at a loss to understand what particular quality distinguishes progressive 
from the good old-fashioned Democracy under which cur Government was formed. I 
know but little of this new school, but the little I do know has not impressed me favor- 
ably. I am too old to adopt neW' theories of government, especially when lam satisified 
with my early creed. Progressive democracy, from ail 1 have heard of it, does not ap- 
pear to be over modest in its pretensions. It has little reverence for the time-honored 
opinions of the sages and founders of our institutions. Nor is it content with their re- 
sults, happy and glorious as they are and have been, ft aspires to the invention of 
Something still mote marvellous lor the improvement of the condition of society and of 
mankind. It claims alliance and joint origin with steam-power, by sea and land; with 
the locomotive, the steam-ship, and steam press; with the magnetic telegraph, and, 
in its arrogance, would seem ready to wrest the .ightuiug from Deity, and claim it for 
•its own creation We have heard its disciples and partisans declaiming perpetually of 
the extension of the area of freedom. Our present limits are quite too contracted, and 
nothing less than a continent can give scope for the development of their principles. 
Old ideas and all existing institutions have fulfilled their missions, and must give place 
to new ones more conformable to the true destiny of man. 

Indeed, sir, in regard to the recent invention called progressive democracy I am as 
ignorant and as much puzzled and confounded by the declaration of its expounders as the 
lnca of Peru when Pizarro caused his chaplain to explain to him, through an interpreter, 
the extent of his authority and the heavenly character of his mission to America. The 
reverend priest spo';e first of the Holy Trinity; then of the Pope of Rome, and last of 
the Emperor Charles V., and of the powers and attributes of each But the mystery 
was too profouud for the untutored mind of the Indian. The good lnca, in despair, ex- 
claimed, " Wo is me ! all that you say of your Three-one-God, of the great man who 
sits upon the seven hills, and of another great man called the Emperor, 1 cannot under- 
stand ; but I see plainly that you claim the right to take from me my country and to 
destroy my people." 

Mr. President, from the views I have presented on this subject, it will be perceived 
that I have not proceeded on the ground that the Administration entertained any scheme 
for the conquest of Mexicu until after the termination of the campaign of Gen. Scott, 
by the capture of the city of Mexico, and the failurs of Mr. 'Prist's negotiation. A,t this 
period of the war, I have undertaken to show that a policy was conceived and adopted 
in the further prosecution of the war, and which is stiil persisted in, which in its inevita- 
ble tendency must lead to the final subjugation ol that country. I have also endeavored 
to establish, from the tenor of the message itself and numerous other proofs and cir- 
cumstances, that the Administration have. looked to this as the possible, if not piobable, 
result of its policy ; that they have weighed the consequences and resolved to risk them. 
In the course of my remarks I have given full weight to the argument of the force of 
circumstances, and the real difficulties and embarrassments in which the Administration 
is involved in bringing the war to a close, as the inducement to the policy now persisted 
in. It will also be observed, that in the discussion of this subject I have not considered 
it material what the real views of the Executive may be upon the question of final cot> 



quest and annexation. But I have insisted and firmly believe that the further prosecu- 
tion of this war, according to the plan now in operation and for the objects explicitly- 
avowed, whether the Administration wills it or not, can have no other termination than 
the one I have assumed as inevitable. 

Thus, sir, the real question before us is not whether we shall pass the bill, but how 
we shall stop this war or control by our resolves the future prosecution of it. It is clear, 
sir, that we have arrived at a point in our history which will be memorable in all time 
for good or for evil. It is an epoch ! It is not like the erises alluded to by the honora- 
ble chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. It is not a question regarding the 
settlement of disputed points of domestic policy ; whether the protection of domestic 
industry or free trade be the true policy of the country; or whether a national bank or 
the subtreasury would be the most suitable fiscal agent of the Government; but it is 
a contest of principle, in which the whole frame and policy of our free system of go- 
vernment, is liable to be unsettled and revolutionized. We areas a nation about to enter 
upon a perilous enierprise, as vast in its aims as it is daring in its conception. The pro- 
posiiion is, or soon will be, if not arrested by the National Legislature, the incorporation 
into our Union of a territory large enough to found an empire of itself. Surely, sir, be- 
fore we try " the hazard of this untrod state," we should pause. I am persuaded that 
the boldest, and even the most reckless, of those who favor this gigantic project must 
feel some trepidation, some misgiving. If they are patriots, as I doubt not they are, 
they will pause before they launch into an unknown stream that will carry them and the 
counrry they know not where. It is a question which' invokes to its discussion and de- 
cision all the genius, and talents, and wisdom of the land. And if any of my Whig 
friends in this chamber or elsewhere suppose that, alter all, there is no great danger of 
the success of this scheme of conquest and annexation, ..extravagant as it may appear to 
them, let me warn them that they are lulling themselves into a false security. 

Permit me to advert for a single moment to some of the elements of popular influence 
which exist in favor of this policy, and the advantage of the position which its advocates 
enjoy over their opponents. Why, sir, the very magnitude of the proposition, though 
startling at first from a distrust of its consequences, soon becomes a source of favor and 
support. The passion for the grand, the vast, and the marvellous, inherent in the mind, 
especially of the youthful and ardent, soon produces its natural effect, and overcomes all 
obstacles. Why, sir, I confess that when I give the reins to the imagination I am in- 
toxicated with the grandeur of the prospects that may be opened to us as a nation. Sir, 
it is a dangerous subject to contemplate With all the fearful consequences that may 
arise from the adoption of this great project, some of which I have endeavored to depict, 
it still has great attractions. Pope illustrated the operation of the human mind upon 
such a question in his description of the allurements to vice: 

" Vice is a monster of such frightful mien 

That to be hated needs but to be seen ; 

But seen too oft, familiar with its face, 

We first endure, then pity, then embrace." 

Yes, sir, pity is not an inappropiate idea, for we shall soon hear of the pitiable condi- 
tion of the poor Mexicans ; a prey to all the evils of faction and anarchy. The project, 
though formidable and repulsive to the judgment at first, when it conies to be softened- 
down, and its dangers diminished by the brilliant coloring of fancy, no longer seems so 
fearful and perilous. Add to this the vast extent of the country itself, the broad table 
of the Cordilleras of the Andes, opening out like a fan from the south to the west and 
the north, affording every variety of clime, from the torrid to the temperate; and then 
the grandeur and magnificence of some of its features and the beauty of others. There 
nature exhibits herself in her most sublime and terrific, as well as in her more lovely 
and enchanting aspects. You see snow-capped mointain-peaks towering to the clouds, 
and the scarcely extinct volcano, rising by the side of flowery vales, studded with refresh- 
ing lakes. There, too, nature has bestowed the often fatal gifts of mountains teeming 
with precious metals; and the earthquake not infrequent comes to awaken the guilty 
conscience of the oppressors. It is a country full of stirring recollections. The pen of 
Prescotl has made it a classic land. It was the theatre of the deepest and darkest tra- 
gedy ever enacted. It is the land where once flourished a great and populous empire, 
founded by a race of unknown origin and of mysterious destiny. Sir, striking as these 
things are in themselves, distance gives to them additional charms and increased en- 
chantment. These are some of the attractions which captivate the imagination of the 
young and pervert the judgment of mature age, and we shall see that in due time they 
will be heralded forth throughout this wide country by a thousand tongues in strains of 



29 

vivid and impassioned eloquence. Sir, the gratification of national ambition, the na- 
tional pride, the love of power and dominion which fill the heart of man, the idea that 
we belong to a great and powerful nation, how often, in the history of the world, have 
thev reconciled ihe sincerest patriot to despotic rule encircled with glory. 

Sir, I confess my own weakness; and when I contemplate this picture of national 
greatness, I often find myself wishing that this future cou'd be realized without danger 
to the public liberty. How I would exult if we could only preserve the free institutions 
of the country, its future prosperity and repose. If such are my own feelings, what 
must be the effect of the brilliant destines of the republic presented to the youth of the 
country, full of ardent and ambitious hopes, and whose impulsive and inexperienced 
minds seldom pause to weigh the evils which may attend a career of such glittering pros- 
peels. Sir, who shall undertake to prophecy a favorable issue to this question,"when. 
every temptation to ambition, individual and national, when every lure calculated to ex- 
cite and win over to this scheme of conquest, alike the laudibly curious and enterprising 
among the youth of the country, and the vicious and corrupt slaves of cupidity, are offered 
in rich profusion. 

We must not forget the army. It is already an element of great influence in the country. 
Honest and patriotic as our gallant officers and citizen-soldiers maybe, it is buj natural 
that they will form attachments to the country which has been the scene of their glory, 
and desire its consolidation with their native land. We have already seen e^dences of 
this feeling in the letters and speeches of gallant officers now in the country. They, 
too, are but men like ourselves, with all our passions and separate interests. While 
Mexico continues to be the seat of war, they may expect to win new laurels in the ser- 
vice of their country. The ambitious among them who have not yet reached marked 
distinction will desire new occasions for the display of heroic valor. And when all Mexi- 
co shall be subdued to our dominion, and no new fields of martial distinction shall be 
presented, they may still expect to find employment congenial to their habits. 

There is another greater and more formidable influence to be looked to in the settle- 
ment of this question. There is a ijreat and powerful party in this country — a partv 
which, for the last twenty years, with the exception of a slight interval, has held the 
reins of power and enjoyed the honors and emoluments of the civil service. The results 
of the late elections have shaken their security, and they may be expected to put forth 
all 'heir energies to maintain their ascendency. If the President persists in his present 
policy a few months longer, the issue must come to be, "the conquest of all Mexico." 
I do not suppose that every member of the party will yield their settled convictions on 
this subject for party considerations; far otherwise. W e have already heard the voice 
of opposition to this policy from the other side of this chamber. The distinguished 
Senator from South Carolina has led the way, and I trust many others will follow. But 
party is a tyrant. Ue Tocqueville was right when he said that in few countries of the 
worlJ was political opinion less free than in this free country of ours. Who that has 
been in public life has not felt the party lash ? What so galling to the feelings of an 
ingenuous mind and a patriot as to find himself compelled to relinquish his station, or to 
yield to the behest or dictation, often of inferior minds, who, by superior chances, come 
to be considered party leaders? and the brightest genius sometimes makes a fatal blunder. 

Sir, in calculating the advantages which the supporters of the policy of conquest pos- 
sess, and the chances of averting such an issue in the coming political conflict, there is 
one of a peculiar character which deserves to be considered. It arises from the dilem- 
ma in which the President is placed, in part by himself and his friends, and in part by 
the Whig opposition. The President, very early in the progress of the war, declared 
his purpose of retaining New Mexico and California. But his friends of the North and 
East said to him, You shall not take those territories but upon condition of the Wilmot 
proviso. The Whigs of the South became alarmed, and united with the North in the 
no-territory policy. Thus was the President checkmated both by his friends and oppo- 
nents. This was his dilemma; how to escape from it was the question. He had no 
way to escape but by frankly retracing his steps, acknowledging his error, and making 
a treaty without the cession of territory ; but that few men in high station, and who as- 
pire to the rank of statesmen, can afford to do. It requires a great man, a very great 
man, to do this. I do not mean to speak offensively of the President. I consider the 
embarrassment under which he was thus placed in reference to the conclusion of the war, 
great and serious. If he treated with Mexico without the territories, nothing but the 
military glory achieved in the war would remain, after all the sacrifices of the country 
in the prosecution of it. From this embarrassment nothing could relieve him but the 
intervention of Congress by declaring the objects of the war. Hence, was he tempted 
continually to a new line of policy ; and the refusal of the Government of Mexico to 



30 

treat with Mr. Trist, with the brilliant conquests of Gen. Scott, pave the encouragement 
to the new and extended objects of the war which now constitute his avowed policy. 
And the causes which produced this determination mum still embarrass the President in 
any attempt to close this war unless Congress will relieve him. He is still impelled by 
a dire moral necessity, either to degrade himself from the rank of "statesmen, by the 
voluntary confession of error, or to take the hazard of elevating himself to a still higher 
fame, or of losing all, by involving his country in a fatal enterprise. 

But, sir, the friends and supporters of the President and his administration are embar- 
rassed by the same causes; they are in a like dilemma with himself, and one in which 
they involved both him and themselves. Hence the temptation to them to adopt a new 
and bolder policy ; to extend their views far beyond New Mexico and California. A 
whole party, powerful in resources of skill, talent, and patronage, are thus placed in cir- 
cumstances strongly urging them to an issue which at one bound clears every barrier — 
relieves them from all past embarrassments, Wilmot proviso and all — and if they should 
fail, they will fall in the execution of a bold conception; but if, on the other hand, they 
should be successful, and carry out the daring project of uniting all Mexico to our Union, 
the leaders of the enterprise will leave a name in history of no half way measure of 
renown or dishonor. The fame of the authors of the movement must rise with the in- 
creasing glory of a stiil free country; or their names will be execrated amid the brokeu 
and crumb#ng ruins of the republic. 

Such, sir, are the dangers and temptations to which the country now stands exposed; 
and if the party in power shall determine to make the issue I have supposed, who can 
estimate its force in the decision which the country must declare. 

And what, sir, are the resources of power and influence which the opponents of this 
scheme have at their command ? Where the high official stations ? what patronage to 
uphold the public press — to stimulate the zeal of partizans ? None, sir, none. They 
must rely alone upon the moral influence and considerations inherent in the question it- 
self. Does any one inquire where is the Whig opposition — the great Whig party? 
Why, sir, as a parjy, the W higs, in standing out against this policy, are shorn of half 
their strength by the very idea that their opposition springs from party motives ; and 
further, by their position in seeming to withhold supplies for the prosecution af a war in 
which the country is engaged with a foreign foe ; by" the cry of treason and alliance with 
the public enemy. Instead of an advantage, the idea of a party opposition, from the 
necessity of the case, is a formidable drawback to the influence of those who look with 
alarm to the results of the further prosecution of the war. 

But, sir, while we thus stand confronted with this question, involving the future liber- 
ties of the country, the greatest but one that can ever be debated in this chamber, (the 
question of union and national existence,) what do we behold ? Vv here are th^ members 
of that glorious Whig fraternity ? Where their great leaders, including the most dis- 
tinguished and experienced statesmen of the country, and to whom the country mainly 
looks, and has a right to look, to save it from the impending calamity ? Where those to 
whom the country looks for wise counsel, prompt and energetic action,«at such a crisis? 
And what are they doing? Hesitating and faltering in their arrangements for the coming 
conflict; disputing about old usages; insisting on personal preferences; distracted by 
narrow sectional jealousies. When the ground on which they stand is volcanic, and they 
already feel the throbbing of the smother ed elements, instead of flying quickly to the 
only safe refuge that offers, they stop to gather up a budget of old hobbies, precious old 
wares, some new, personal, and mixed, altogether load enough to sink a navy; they 
pau>ie to consider whether some other mode of escape may not present itself; to see if 
the threatened shock may not pa:-s off without injury. When the real question is, 
whether all Mexico shall be annexed, they moot the point whether it would be proper to 
take a slip of it, more or less; and, when the North and the South are threatened by- 
one equal fatality, it is debated whether the slave power should not be hedged in by a 
proviso! Yes, sir, I regret to say that the vomito prieto is not confined to the tierra 
cSHienteoi Mexico. A pnlnicio vomito prieto prevails to an alarming extent at the North 
and East, which I much fear will prove more destructive to our dearest interests than it 
has done to our brave soldiers in Mexico. And thus, sir, at a period perhaps the most 
momentous that has occurred in our history, and when all jealousies, sectional and per- 
sonal, and the jostling of individual ambition should be resolutely disregarded, those of 
every section, who are anxious to stand by the republic, and rescue her institutions from 
the dangers that gather round them, are shorn of their strength, distracted, and paralyzed 
by their own divisions. 

Sir, does any of my Whig friends consider that I exaggerate the probability that the 
issue will be such as I have assumed. From the evidences before them do they consider 



31 

it questionable ? Why, sir, if there was nothing else to warn them of the nature of the 
corning struggle, the speech of the honorable chairman of the Committee on Military 
Affairs, it seems to me, ought to suffice. Have you not seen that able Senator, up to a 
recent period of his life distingui^httl for the philosophic vein wh ch runs through all: 
his writings and speeches, fling aside his philosophy and proclaim the superioiity of in- 
stinct over the conclusions of reason, in estimating military glory as an element of na- 
tional suength ; giving himself up to the encouragement and support of al! the extrava- 
ganzas o progressive democracy in declaring that he can see no great cause of alarm in 
the idea of extending our dominion over the whole continent. I mean no offence to that 
distinguished Senator; 1 have a high regard both for his talents and his private virtues; 
but 1 must say that i am utterly amazed by his remarks upon this subject ; 1 must say 
of his new course that though it may be fortunate lor him, it must be deeply afflictive to 
bis country. Llut, upon the introduction of the resolutions offered upon this subject by 
the distinguished Senator from Souih Carolina, (Mr. Calhouis,)— and may this Senate 
ever boast one or more such Senators, who may possess the moral courage to rise above 
party on a questiou like this, and give himself to his country alone — what more did we 
hear liom the honorable Senator from Michigan? Sir, it was that the questions pre- 
sented in the resolutions were mere abstract propositions, which, if adopted, could have 
no practical operation or influence in preventing the catastrophe against which the reso- 
lut on was pointed. " Why, sir," exclaimed the Senator, "if the people will the an- 
negation ot Mexico, nothing in our power to do can prevent it ; you may as well plant 
yourself upon the brink of the cataract of Niagara and bid the waters be still.'' 

W ell, sir, does the hon-.rable Senator really believe that nothing the Senate can do, no 
resolution that can be adopted here, no declaration of opinion upon this great question^ 
w.ll have any effect with the country or among the. people ? And has the Senate sunk 
so low? And is it so that the Senate, which is presumed to be composed of gentlemen 
of large experience in public affairs, statesmen distinguished for their ability and patriot- 
ism iii the States they represent, on a question involving the greatest consequences, and 
BUch as may decide forever the experiment of free republican institutions, can have no in- 
fluence with the yeomen of the country — with the farmer at his plough, the merchant 
at liis counter or his desk, the mechanic in his worshop— a class which always look only 
lo the good of the country, which is never disturbed nor biased by dreams of personal 
ambition, and who value their constitution and the Union as the guaranties as they are 
of their domestic happiness, the security of their lives and property, and the preservation 
of their privileges, civil and religious. Sir, f can subscribe to no such conclusion.' Sir, . 
does the bono able Senator really suppose that the declaration of his individual opinions 
and sentiments on this great question, or any other on this floor, can have no weight with 
the people of this country? If he does, I can assure the honorable Senator that he great- 
Is undervalues the estimation in which he is held in thi* country, both for his talents and 
his patriotism. Sir, whenever that day shall come that the opinions of the American 
Senate can have no influence in correcting the impulses of popular feeling, the hastily 
formed and ill-considered opinions of the people upon a question involving their liberties, 
I shall not calculate how long- those liberties may endure, or how soon they may perish. 
Mr. President, I have reflected much upon the question, in all its grave aspects, and I 
feel compelled to express the conviction that, as a people enjoying the fruits of a free sys- 
tem of Government, we stand ou the very brink of our fate. If we do not stop this war 
now, or before another new year — one step further in our present course and we shall be 
borne by an irresistible current, beyond retreat or rescue, into irretrievable misfortune 
and ruin. If we are saved it will be by the providence of God, not of man. 

T iiere is something, Mr. President, in our present relations with Mexico — something 
so unusual, not to say wonderful, in all the incidents of this war — that, were 1 supersti- 
tious, I should say that a higher power than ours holds the issues of it, and lor purposes 
we may not comprehend. The instances of individual self-sacrifice, of reckless yet suc- 
cessful adventure, of such frequent occurrence in this war, carry us back in search of 
parallel examples to the heroic ages of antiquity, and seem fitter subjects for fabulous 
and romantic narrative, than the sober pages of truthful history. There is no record in 
the history of modern warfare, nor ancient either, of a more brilliant and uninterrupted 
series oi' well fought battles and victorious results against such odds as that which now 
forms part of the imperishable annals of the republic; and when we contemplate the 
intrepidity and skili of our officers; the impetuous valor whieh has distinguished every 
corps of our army, whether of regular soldiers or of volunteers — a valor which neither 
natural obstructions', nor, military defences, nor a force often five times more numerous^ 
could arrest in th'eir rapid and victorious career — we are involuntarily reminded of the 
similar and thrilling exploits of Cortez in the same fields of military fame — in the laud 
which, by this double act of conquest, seems devoted. 



32 

It is now about three hundred years since that extraordinary man, with a band of adventu- 
rers less than seven hundred in number, urged on by two of the strongest passions of our 
nature, cupidity and religious fanaticism, landed upon an unknown shore, burnt his ships, 
attacked — and, after enacting scenes so mixed of craft, cruelty, and blood, yet so gilded 
over vvith feats of high chivalry and dauntless courage that the muse of history pauses ia 
her task, and hesitates to praise or blame — overthrew a populous and powerful empire. 
These victorious adventurers were the ancestors and countrymen of that race which ever 
since has held sway over the conquered country, whatever form the Government has 
assumed, whether Vice Regal or free. It was an Indian race that peopled the empire 
which Cortes overturned ; and they were the ancestors and countrymen of the same race 
which now inhabit the land of their fathers. They were made serfs, the hewers of 
wood and the drawers of water, to their new masters three centuries ago; with some 
amelioration they continue to be so to this day; though free in name, they still wear 
the badges of a subject people — still remain the victims of conquest and of their prime- 
val caste and complexion. Whatever faction rules for the hour, they are still the suffer- 
ers. What religion fails to exact from them, their proud and insolent conquerors extort, 
under the pretext of Government support, or to maintain an army which oppresses them 
in peace and gives them no protection in war. Wonderful retribution ! That at the 
distance of centuries the descendants of the original spoilers should be made to suffer 
the penalty of the wrongs committed by their forefathers; that they. in turn should be 
trodden under the iron heel of war — be made to pass under the yoke of the conqueror. 

Mr. President, if F may be permitted to moralize upon the extraordinary and mysteri- 
ous vicissitudes and coincidences in the fortunes of nations, I would ask what are our 
motives, what our purposes in the further prosecution of this war? Are we sure, sir, 
that the motives of those who direct this war, who put all this chivalry in motion in a for- 
eign land, are not tainted with the lust of conquest ? Are we sure that, whatever cause 
of war may have existed at its origin, other motives and other objects have not super- 
vened less defensible in their character than the rights and honor of the country, the 
only legitimate causes of war ? Are the invaders of this ill-fated country, of the 
nineteenth century, so pure and upright in all their objects, and so far elevated above the 
passions of those of the sixteenth, (hat they may hope to escape the retribution which 
awaited them, and which bas ever awaited the conqueror and oppressor ? 

It is said of Scipio— not he that overcame Hannibal, but Scipio, the destroyer of Car- 
thage — that when surveying the scene of carnage and desolation around him, and wheu 
he saw the wife of Hasdrubal, arrayed in her richest apparel, slowly ascending to the 
summit of the temple which rose above the conflagration, and thence, after stabbing her 
children, precipitate herself into the burning elements below, he wept, but it was not 
over Carthage — Rome rose up to his view with all her crimes and oppressions, and he 
saw inscribed on the rolls of her future history the sentence of eternal justice that she, 
too, must fall. 

Sir, if any should now desire to know my poor opinion of the proper mode of termina- 
ting this war, I say to them, make the best treaty with any existing Government you can. 
If you must have the territories of New Mexico and California, get a cession of them; 
if you cannot do that, come back to the Rio Grande — to the bouddary you claim title to, 
and thus save your honor. 

My advice is, Stop the war ! Flee the country as you would a city doomed to des- 
truction bv fire from Heaven ! 




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